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Unmanned aerial vehicles—”UAVs” or “drones”—are 
increasingly becoming a mainstream commercial phenomenon 
and tool for a vast range of commercial consumer, prosumer, 
and professional activities. Given advances in automation and 
miniaturization generally—and flight control stability and 
autopilot systems specifically—anyone can now fly in any 
airspace at any time by operating hand-held fixed-wing 
aircraft or quadcopters with little more than an ordinary 
smartphone or tablet. As such, sales of store-bought drones 
number in the millions,1 corresponding to the wide range of 
civil applications and value propositions that UAVs offer. 
Though civil drones are an attractive business investment, 
substantial regulatory headwinds confront the drone industry 
as startups endeavor to get to market and scale quickly. This 
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is so notwithstanding—or perhaps even because of—the 
celebrated abilities of most small UAVs to fly boundlessly and 
collect and record information from nearly any vantage point. 
Drones are a classically disruptive technology of social, 
economic, and legal norms. Their operations raise novel and 
valid concerns in many of these areas, particularly in terms of 
safety and privacy. Consequently, regulators have responded—
and they should. But federal, state, and local lawmakers alike 
have responded with policy interventions that are too often 
premature (or untimely) and overly rigid, discouraging the 
many beneficial uses of UAV technology. In fact, on the basis 
of ephemeral fears rather than data, regulators initially put in 
place overbroad and permission-based restraints that were 
tantamount to a de facto ban on all drone operations. 
This Article critiques the underlying thinking and 
approach that federal regulators have taken with respect to 
civil drones and argues that commercial UAVs should be a 
“permissionless innovation.” This Article posits that a better 
alternative to a top-down, ex-ante regulatory scheme is to 
broadly allow commercial UAVs and to deal with careless or 
reckless or nefarious operators and operations on a case-by-
case, ex-post basis. In doing so, this Article aims to present 
lessons learned in the context of commercial UAVs so that 
inefficiencies and paternalistic rulemaking can be avoided in 
the regulation of other innovations associated with the Internet 
of Things, including urban air mobility and electric vertical-
takeoff-and-landing technologies—otherwise known as flying 
cars—that are just around the corner. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unmanned aerial vehicles—also referred to as “UAVs” or 
“drones”—are revolutionizing business. In fact, as an 
Oppenheimer emerging technologies and services report 
emphatically stated, “[t]he emergence of consumer and 
commercial UAVs is inevitable.”2 Agreeing with this assertion, 
this Article explains how drones are becoming an increasingly 
mainstream tool for a vast range of commercial consumer, 
prosumer, and professional activities. This Article further 
seeks to show how and why ex-ante prohibitions and 
precautionary thinking among lawmakers with respect to 
drone-based businesses have impeded the full potential of 
UAV innovation to date, both in theory and in practice. 
Like self-driving cars, digital drugs, wearable technologies, 
and other wireless and networked devices that fall under the 
classification “Internet of Things” (“IoT”), drones are a “smart” 
technology that exemplify machine learning. At the center of 
the drone revolution are airplanes equipped with artificially 
intelligent and sophisticated sensor suites, high definition 
cameras, global positioning systems, and algorithmic-driven, 
cloud-based software solutions that capture, store, and 
analyze big data. The use of drones for military purposes, 
including “signature strikes” or intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance missions, initially clouded public perception 
and acceptance of the technology.3 Since approximately 2006, 
 
2 ANDREW UERKWITZ ET AL., OPPENHEIMER & CO., DRONE INDUSTRY 
REPORT: “I”S IN THE SKY 3 (2016) [hereinafter DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT]. 
3 Use of combat drones raises legal issues involving the law of armed 
conflict, sovereignty, and cyberwarfare—issues beyond the scope of this 
Article. See generally Charles Jarnot, History, in INTRODUCTION TO 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 1, 1–15 (Richard K. Barnhart et al. eds., 
2012); see also P. W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR (2009). 
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however, investment in civil and commercial drones has been 
vigorous and the public perception of drones—even the 
militarized connotation of the word drone itself—has softened 
somewhat. “Moving at the pace of the smartphone industry, 
not the aerospace industry, drones went from hackers’ devices 
to hobbyists’ instruments to toys costing less than $100 at 
your local big-box store in less than four years—perhaps the 
fastest transfer of technology from CIA to Costco in history.”4  
The wide-spread availability and affordability of micro- 
and small drones—i.e., drones weighing under .55 lbs., or 
between .55 lbs. and 55 lbs., respectively—has opened low 
altitude airspace above every community in every nation 
around the world to countless new users and uses, including 
for hobby, recreational, and commercial purposes, in less than 
a decade. Given advances in automation and miniaturization 
generally, and flight control stability and autopilot systems 
specifically, anyone can now fly in any airspace at any time by 
operationalizing hand-held fixed-wing aircraft or quadcopters 
out-of-the-box with little more than an ordinary smartphone 
or tablet. The end user is everybody, from proprietors to 
prisoners.5 As such, sales of store-bought drones number in 
the millions, corresponding to the extensive number of civil 
applications and value propositions that UAVs offer. The 
drone industry includes precision agriculture, aerial 
photography and journalism, urban planning, real estate, 
insurance, pipeline and railroad monitoring, construction, 
emergency management, power line inspection, educational 
and academic uses, entertainment, and—perhaps most 
rousing—logistics and telecommunications. 
 
4 Chris Anderson, The Drone Economy, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2017, 
at 5. 
5 Niraj Chokshi, South Carolina Inmate May Have Used Drone in 
Prison Escape, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/07/us/drone-inmate-escape.html; 
Michael S. Rosenwald, Prisons Try to Stop Drones from Delivering Drugs, 
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Only four years after Jeff Bezos created buzz on 60 Minutes 
by announcing that his company would deliver up to eighty-
six percent of its entire inventory by drone,6 Amazon applied 
for a patent in 2017 “for beehive-like towers that . . . serve as 
multi-level fulfillment centers for its delivery drones to take 
off and land.”7 Meanwhile, with Project Aquila and Project 
Loon, Facebook and Google, respectively, are experimenting 
with unmanned networks of high-altitude long-endurance 
drones (“HALEs”) and flying stratospheric balloons to serve as 
floating internet connections 65,000 feet above remote and 
underserved parts of the planet.8 Closer to the ground (i.e., 
two hundred feet above the grass), AT&T has deployed its 
Flying COW—“Cell on Wings”—to assist with post-Hurricane 
Maria relief efforts in Puerto Rico.9 AT&T’s Pulse Vapor 55 is 
a tethered-drone fitted with LTE radios and antennas to 
function like a temporary cell service tower in the sky, 
restoring voice, data, and internet service to isolated areas.10 
Taken together, these drone-centered business activities 
 
6 60 Minutes: Amazon’s Jeff Bezos Looks to the Future (CBS television 
broadcast Dec. 1, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazons-jeff-
bezos-looks-to-the-future/ [perma.cc/54YD-A697]. Contra Paul Ziobro, 
Teamsters Tell UPS: No Delivery Drones or Driverless Trucks, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/teamsters-tell-ups-
no-drones-or-driverless-trucks-1516795200 [perma.cc/EY26-QYAQ].  
7 Kaya Yurieff, Amazon Patent Reveals Drone Delivery ‘Beehives’, CNN 
TECH (June 23, 2017, 9:44 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/ 
06/23/technology/amazon-drone-beehives/index.html [perma.cc/FF88-
L3GW]. 
8 See e.g., PROJECT LOON, https://x.company/loon/ [perma.cc/8WZF-
BAMJ]; Darrell Etherington, Facebook’s Aquila Drone Completes Its Second 
Test Flight, Lands Well This Time, TECHCRUNCH (June 29, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/29/facebooks-aquila-drone-completes-it-
second-testflight-lands-well-this-time/ [perma.cc/6SQW-Z5Z5]. 
9 See Scott Berinato, Flying COWs and Other Drone Apps, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (May 17, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/flying-cows-and-other-drone-
apps [perma.cc/ZK9F-G6L8]; see also David Shepardson, FAA Approves 
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reveal the core value of commercial drones: data. As Chris 
Anderson, CEO of 3D Robotics and former editor of Wired, 
wrote, “reality capture” makes drones an interesting business 
case.11 
More than anything, drones are collection vehicles. 
Their ability to amass data from a unique, valuable 
perspective (above, but not too far above) fast and at 
low cost makes them ideal collectors. Any drone 
strategy must consider not only the drone itself but 
also data management, which means bringing 
innovation to the cloud.12 
That is, with a drone,  
the process of digitizing the physical world by 
scanning it inside and out—from the ground and the 
air—has finally matured into a technology that’s 
transforming business. It can be seen in small ways in 
Google Maps, where data is captured by satellites, 
airplanes, and cars, and presented in both 2-D and 3-
D. Now that kind of mapping, initially designed for 
humans, is done at much higher resolution in 
preparation for the self-driving car, which needs 
highly detailed 3-D maps of cities in order to 
efficiently navigate. The methods used to create such 
models of the real world are related to “motion 
capture” technology, which drives movies and video 
games today. Normally that requires bringing the 
production to the scanners—putting people in a large 
room outfitted for scanning and then creating the 
scene. But drones flip that process, allowing 
businesspersons to bring the scanners to the scene. 
Drones involve regular cameras (and some smart 
software) precisely revolving around objects to create 
photo-realistic digital models.13 
As a consequence of the data collection capacity of drones, 
businesspersons in the drone space, rather than merely seeing 
“airplanes without pilots,” see an “internet of flying things” 
 
11 Anderson, supra note 4, at 3. 
12 Id. at 7. 
13 Id. at 3. 
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made up of “smartphones with propellers” that “offer, 
literally, a new view into business: Their low-overhead 
perspective is bringing new insights and capabilities to fields 
and factories alike.”14 Maybe most compelling is the fact that 
drones are an exotropic technology—their value is derived 
from ever-evolving software rather than fixed or static 
hardware; and thus, drones will rise in value over time rather 
than gravitate toward obsolescence.15  
Though UAVs are an attractive business investment, 
substantial regulatory headwinds confront the drone industry 
as startups endeavor to get to market and scale quickly. This 
is so notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—the celebrated 
abilities of most small UAVs to fly boundlessly and collect and 
record information from nearly any vantage point. Drones are 
a classically disruptive technology of social, economic, and 
legal norms. Their operations raise novel and valid concerns 
in many of these areas, particularly in terms of safety and 
privacy.16 Indeed, with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(the “FAA”) projecting the integration of seven million drones 
into the airspace by 2020,17 the question of how drones can fly 
safely in a national airspace system originally designed for 
manned flight is both daunting and critical.18 The risk that 
 
14 Id. at 4. 
15 Id. at 8 (“[R]ather than follow the traditional long decay slope from 
point of purchase, connected devices improve in utility for as long as they 
can. In the case of drones, new abilities, from improved performance to new 
autonomous features, just appear overnight via ‘over the air’ upgrades.”). 
16 See, e.g., Paul Mozur, China Drone Maker Says It May Share Data 
with State, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/asia/dji-drones-china.html 
(“Already, DJI’s user agreement flags the possibility that whoever flies a 
drone may not be flying it alone. It reads: ‘Please note that if you conduct 
your flight in certain countries, your flight data might be monitored and 
provided to the government authorities according to local regulatory 
laws.’”). 
17 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA Releases 2016 to 2036 Aerospace 
Forecast, https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=85227&cid=TW414 
[perma.cc/429D-GZAB] (last modified Mar. 24, 2016, 12:10 PM). 
18 See generally Doug Lenz & Dae Suh, Navigating Quickly Crowding 
Skies, AIRPORT MAG., Sept. 2016, at S12–13 (“Airports across the country 
are seeing record passenger counts . . . . As airspace becomes increasingly 
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novice or nefarious UAV operators will collide or interfere 
with traditional aircraft is not merely a hypothetical worry. 
The title of a recent article from the United Kingdom—“Idiot 
Flies Drone Alongside Flybe Jet Landing at Newquay 
Airport”—illustrates the point.19 In addition to operational 
issues, UAV operations are stretching common law doctrines 
related to, for instance, intellectual property, negligence, and 
trespass, as well as constitutional principles under the First, 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. 
Consequently, regulators have responded—and they should.  
But, federal, state, and local lawmakers alike have 
responded with policy interventions that too often are 
premature (or untimely) and overly rigid, discouraging the 
many beneficial uses of UAV technology. In fact, on the basis 
of ephemeral fears rather than data, regulators initially put 
in place overbroad, permission-based restraints that were 
tantamount to a de facto ban on all drone operations.20 For 
example, in July 2013, Virginia became the first state in the 
nation to enact drone legislation—or more accurately, anti-
drone legislation. 21  The Virginia law imposed a two-year 
moratorium on the flight of all state or local law enforcement 
drones for the purpose of gathering evidence pursuant to a 
search warrant.22 As other states also began to implement 
 
crowded with additional planes, and with the upsurge in UAS, aerospace 
officials at NASA say the current Air Traffic Control System will not be 
equipped to handle the predicted volume or variety of aircraft expected in 
2035 and beyond.”). 
19 Gareth Corfield, Idiot Flies Drone Alongside Flybe Jet Landing at 
Newquay Airport, REGISTER (Aug. 11, 2016, 12:06 PM), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/08/11/drone_near_miss_flybe_newquay_
airport/ [perma.cc/8RML-TZWJ] (“Although the near-miss was reported to 
police, a search of the area revealed no trace of the drone or its operator.”). 
20 See e.g., Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable 
Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing 
Innovation, 21 RICH. J.L & TECH. 6, 68 (2015). 
21 See e.g., Jason Koebler, Virginia Becomes First State to Pass Drone 
Regulations, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 5, 2013, 4:42 AM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/05/virginia-becomes-first-
state-to-pass-drone-regulations-. 
22 2013 Va. Acts, ch. 755. 
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restrictive drone laws, Congress addressed pent-up demand 
by the business drone community by explicitly directing the 
FAA to implement a plan to integrate UAVs into the national 
airspace system (the “NAS”) “not later than” September 30, 
2015.23 However, the FAA did not produce any permissive 
UAS regulations until almost a year after this deadline (and 
four years after the law setting the deadline was passed). 
Consequently, unscrupulous UAV operators were left alone to 
profit in a wild west-type marketplace while an emerging and 
conscientious drone business community was left abandoned 
by regulators for years. A patchwork of inconsistent laws 
respecting the use of drones for business purposes resulted. 
In 2016, the FAA ultimately codified a national, uniform 
set of regulations—14 C.F.R. Part 107 (“Part 107”)—for the 
operation of small UAVs (i.e., UAVs weighing between .55 lbs. 
and 55 lbs.).24 However, drone makers and businesses remain 
unsatisfied about the pace of commercial drone lawmaking 
and the permission-based restrictions now in place. In fact, 
the law continues to disallow (subject to a waiver process) 
some of the most valuable operations for UAV businesses, 
including operations at night, over people, beyond visual line 
of sight (“BVLOS”), from a moving vehicle, and above a 400-
feet altitude ceiling. The manner in which regulators have (or 
have not) adapted to the drone revolution over the last 
decade—from moratoria to less restrictive schema under Part 
107—are instructive for investors of IoT advancements that 
are rapidly changing the business law landscape. 
This Article critiques the underlying thinking and 
approach that regulators have taken with respect to civil 
drones and argues that commercial UAVs should be a 
“permissionless innovation” such that “the burden of proof 
rests on those who favor precautionary regulation; they must 
explain why ongoing experimentation with IoT technologies 
should be prevented preemptively by force of law.”25 As a 
predicate to this argument, Part II of this Article overviews 
 
23 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 
§ 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. 11 (2012). 
24 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. pt. 107 (2018). 
25 Thierer, supra note 20, at 3. 
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the market segments, investors, and companies that make up 
the drone economy and details the business applications that 
drones offer an emerging commercial UAV space. Part II also 
discusses business ethics quandaries that rule-following (i.e., 
risk-averse) commercial UAV firms confront when no rules or 
only uncertain or ambiguous policies exist. Part III then sets 
out the main business law issues that will shape and are being 
shaped by the commercial UAV industry and around which 
UAV stakeholders must navigate, including federalism, 
preemption, and the common law. Part IV then presents four 
examples of faults in the regulatory approach thus far taken 
by the FAA with respect to commercial drones. Finally Part V 
concludes that a better alternative to a top-down UAV 
regulatory scheme is one that generally allows commercial 
UAV operations and instead addresses careless, reckless, or 
nefarious operators and operations on a case-by-case ex-post 
basis. In doing so, this Article aims to present some lessons 
learned in the specific context of commercial UAVs so that 
inefficiencies and paternalistic rulemaking is avoided in other 
areas where the law interfaces with IoT devices. 
II. THE DRONE ECONOMY 
Stories about hobbyists, small businesses, and major 
corporations using—or wanting to use—drones for exciting 
and unexpected purposes are in the news every day.26 For 
example, in November 2017, an Illinois university delivered 
college admissions acceptance letters by drone to high school 
students.27 Only a few years earlier, Dominos delivered the 
world’s first pizza-by-drone in New Zealand,28 before which 7-
 
26 See, e.g., Laura Stampler, 8 Weirdest Ways People Are Using Drones, 
TIME (July 14, 2014), http://time.com/2981749/8-of-the-weirdest-ways-
people-are-using-drones/ [perma.cc/EFP4-HTG5]. 
27 See Lewis University Uses UAS to Deliver Acceptance Letters to Local 
High School Students, AUVSI (Nov. 15, 2017), 
http://www.auvsi.org/industry-news/lewis-university-uses-uas-deliver-
acceptance-letters-local-high-school-students [perma.cc/6M7T-4PHA]. 
28 See David Reid, Domino’s Delivers World’s First Ever Pizza by Drone, 
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/16/dominos-has-delivered-the-
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Eleven, in tandem with drone maker Flirtey, made the first 
commercial delivery of any kind in the United States (a 
chicken sandwich, donuts, coffee, candy, and Slurpees) to a 
private residence in Nevada.29 In 2014, a London-based sushi 
restaurant deployed “iTable,” a sort of robot-waiter-drone, to 
serve its diners.30 Meanwhile, a club in Las Vegas, for a mere 
$20,000, provided pool-side bar service via a small 
quadcopter.31 Even Pope Francis has a drone of his very own, 
a gift from a Jesuit school in Rome that is “tricked out with 
the colors of the Vatican flag (yellow and white) and bears the 
papal emblem . . . the drone is supposed to represent ‘the 
values of technology in the service of man.’”32 Some of these 
applications are gimmicky or just for fun while others are 
designed to show that a particular business application is 
feasible. Altogether, the underlying value proposition in each 
instance is the operational agility of UAVs and the economic 
opportunity they provide by flying with fewer logistical, 
infrastructure, and human costs and constraints than are 
involved with traditional manned aircraft and helicopters. 
 
worlds-first-ever-pizza-by-drone-to-a-new-zealand-couple.html [perma.cc/ 
7TGB-M48F] (last updated Nov. 16, 2016, 9:02 AM). 
29 See, e.g., Andrew Liptak, 7-Eleven Just Made the First Commercial 
Delivery by Drone, VERGE (July 23, 2016, 10:22 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/23/12262468/7-11-first-retailer-deliver-
food-drone [perma.cc/5BHZ-H8YA]. 
30 Sean Fitz-Gerald, Sushi Restaurant Tests Drone-Driven Food 
Delivery, MASHABLE (June 12, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/06/12/sushi-
drone-delivery [perma.cc/GKX8-JQRY]. 
31 Laura Stampler, This Club Is Offering Poolside Drone Bottle Service, 
TIME (June 19, 2014), http://time.com/2901197/drone-bottle-service/ 
[perma.cc/86RT-2SPZ]. 
32 Abby Ohlheiser, Pope Francis Has a Drone of His Very Own, WASH. 
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A. From Hardware to Software 
Eccentric and aspirational drone users and uses aside,33 
the fundamental value of a UAV lies in its small and 
miniaturized hardware, specifically an aerial platform 
(typically with a flying camera) that can perform “dirty, dull, 
and dangerous” missions more nimbly and cost-effectively 
than manned aviation assets.34 Given the ability of drones to 
fly just above the ground, outdoors, indoors, and even 
underground35 governments around the world are recognizing 
drones as a tool that can upend society—for better or worse. 
In India, for example, voting officials outfitted five drones 
with cameras to monitor proper election processes. 36 
Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates is intent on using 
drones to deliver ID cards, drivers licenses, passports, and 
medicine. Additionally, the UAE hosts an annual tournament 
titled “Drones for Good,” offering one million dollars to private 
firms and entrants for the idea that best encourages useful 
and positive civil applications of drone technology.37 Indeed, 
 
33 See, e.g., Cat Drone Inventor Works on Flying Cows, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
3, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36954689 [perma.cc/5FC4-
GWQ9] (reporting that a man “best known for turning his dead cat Orville 
into a drone [now] aims to see humans riding on their animals in the sky”). 
34 Bernard Marr, The 4 Ds of Robotization: Dull, Dirty, Dangerous and 
Dear, FORBES (Oct. 16, 2017, 12:28 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/10/16/the-4-ds-of-
robotization-dull-dirty-dangerous-and-dear/. 
35 See Mike Cherney, Drones Are Now Operating Underground, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2017, 9:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/miners-aim-
very-sci-fidrones-at-dark-dangerous-places-1509886805 [perma.cc/UNE5-
6DM4]. 
36 See, e.g., Civic Polls in Mathura to Be Conducted using Drones with 
Cameras, NDTV (Nov. 26, 2017, 12:38 AM), https://www.ndtv.com/india-
news/civic-polls-in-mathura-to-be-conducted-using-drones-with-cameras-
1780045 [perma.cc/54W5-9E5D]. 
37 See The UAE Drones for Good Award, DRONES FOR GOOD 
http://www.dronesforgood.ae/ [perma.cc/9LRR-VG3B]; see also Flasal J. 
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the full potential for drones to support public health, safety, 
and welfare is yet to be realized. 
Non-governmental organizations and private firms around 
the world are also answering the call to explore and exploit 
welfare enhancing uses of drones. For example, a Swiss 
team—Flyability—won the inaugural UAE Drones for Good 
prize by demonstrating a gimbal on a collision-proof search-
and-rescue drone designed to operate safely in inaccessible 
environments. 38  Delaware-based WeRobotics is using seed 
money from the U.S. Agency for International Development to 
combat the Zika virus by developing drones that can carry 
sterile mosquitoes into hard-to-reach zones. 39  Elsewhere, 
academics and scientists from the Ocean Alliance are working 
with roboticists to operate “SnotBot,” a drone that hovers 
above whales and lowers a petri dish to collect the mucus-like 
substance exhaled out of the mammals’ blowholes, helping 
researchers collect data about whale behavior without the 
disruption and noise caused by boats or helicopters.40 Finally, 
the San Francisco-based automated logistics firm Zipline is 
working with the Rwandan government to deliver blood and 
vaccines by drone on demand, offering “the world’s only drone 
delivery system at national scale to send urgent medicines 
like blood to patients, no matter where they live.41   
 
38 See, e.g., Nadeem Hanif, Swiss Search-and-Rescue Drone Wins UAE 
Competition, NATIONAL (Feb. 8, 2015, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/swiss-search-and-rescue-drone-wins-uae-
competition-1.80836 [perma.cc/48PY-M6VV]; see also FLYABILITY, 
http://www.flyability.com/ [perma.cc/7RYP-DCVP]. 
39 See, e.g., Maggie Fox, Feds to Fund Plans to Take on Zika Virus with 
Drones, NBC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016, 5:36 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/zika-virus-outbreak/feds-fund-plans-
take-zika-virus-drones-n665241 [perma.cc/3ER2-PT4F]. 
40 See, e.g., April Glaser, Drones Are Being Used by Scientists to Collect 
Whale Snot, RECODE (June 9, 2017, 10:11 AM), 
https://www.recode.net/2017/6/9/15765302/drones-scientists-collect-whale-
snot-health-pollution-oceans-snotbot [perma.cc/QS58-4JRV]. 
41 See ZIPLINE, http://www.flyzipline.com/ [perma.cc/K24T-MTVJ]; see 
also Robert Lee Hotz, In Rwanda, Drones Deliver Medical Supplies to 
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Notwithstanding these wide-ranging activities made 
possible by micro- and small unmanned airplanes, 
“[c]ommercial users don’t want a drone, they want a solution, 
a box with a button.”42  
Advances in software development—and not necessarily in 
aerodynamics—explain the accelerating demand for and 
investment in UAVs in the civil space. A drone is but a piece 
of hardware—a conventionally “dumb” product that traces its 
lineage back to the radio-controlled OQ-19 “Dennymite” drone 
that the U.S. Army used during the 1940s for gunnery 
practice.43 The potentially greater value of a drone lies in the 
system of which a UAV is a part. An unmanned aerial system 
(a “UAS”)44 that pairs a UAV with intelligent flight control, 
automation, data links, telemetry, communications and 
navigation equipment, and high-definition cameras offers 
something more valuable than a remote-controlled airplane—
namely, an informational, revenue-generating tool for an 
ever-expanding range of civil and commercial applications, 
including agriculture, construction, environment 
management, GIS (mapping), humanitarian work, oil and gas, 
cinematography, emergency response, inspection, real estate, 
and urban surveying. As 3D Robotics’ Anderson has noted: 
We’ve focused mostly on drones themselves—the 
hardware, its cost and capabilities, and what we can 
attach to it to get work done. But when setting a drone 
strategy, it’s important to think less about drones and 
 
42 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
43 William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: 
Regulating the Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1139, 1161 (2013). 
44 An “Unmanned Aircraft (“UA”)” is defined as “[a]n aircraft operated 
without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the 
aircraft.” 14 C.F.R. § 107.3 (2018). A “Small Unmanned Aircraft” is defined 
as “[a]n unmanned aircraft weighing less than 55 pounds on takeoff, 
including everything that is onboard or otherwise attached to the aircraft.” 
Id. (emphasis added). “Small Unmanned Aircraft System (“Small UAS”)” is 
defined as “[a] small unmanned aircraft and its associated elements 
(including communication links and the components that control the small 
unmanned aircraft) that are required for the safe and efficient operation of 
the small unmanned aircraft in the national airspace system.” Id. 
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more about apps. The hardware is primarily an empty 
vessel to fill with work to be done: taking photographs 
and video, scanning, moving objects, enabling 
communication. 
And collecting data. Their ability to amass data from 
a unique, valuable perspective (above, but not too far 
above), fast and at a low cost makes them ideal 
collectors. Any drone strategy has to go beyond the 
drone to the data. And that means moving innovation 
to the cloud.45 
* * * 
Drones will remain primarily data-collection vehicles, 
but the breadth of apps for them is only just beginning 
to be discovered . . . drones will gain even greater cost 
advantages when they don’t just remove the pilot from 
the cockpit but remove the pilot entirely. The true 
breakthrough will come with autonomy.46 
In this context, the core value and competency of many 
drone companies is as software developers and engineering 
outfits. For example, Kespry, a California-based drone 
company, makes UAVs and software for the mining, 
construction, and insurance industries.47  AirMap makes a 
platform for generating maps and alerts for airports, 
including technology installed on drones to help with 
preventing aircraft from flying over restricted areas. 48 
PrecisionHawk composes software that analyzes data 
captured from drones used for things like crop analysis in 
agriculture and pipeline inspections for the energy industry.49 
Airspace makes technology to track and take down rogue 
drones in flight near, over, or at sports stadiums and major 
events. 50  In all, UAS fill a “missing middle”—the market 
 
45 Anderson, supra note 4, at 7. 
46 Id. at 5–7. 
47 See The Platform, KESPRY, https://kespry.com/platform/overview 
[perma.cc/8STL-EUQP]. 
48 See AIRMAP, https://www.airmap.com/ [perma.cc/28JL-A4LZ] 
49 See PrecisionFlight Pro, PRECISIONHAWK, https:// 
www.precisionhawk.com/precisionflight-pro [perma.cc/QM3Q-BKZZ] 
50 See AIRSPACE, https://airspace.co/ [perma.cc/5KNQ-KD3L]. 
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“between satellites and street level, digitizing the planet in 
high resolution and near-time at a tiny fraction of the cost of 
alternatives.”51 Thus, software is at the heart of the drone 
revolution and economy, and is why drone companies, to be 
successful, are pressed “to provide end-to-end solutions, from 
hardware, software, and cloud infrastructure (storage and 
analysis), all the way to client-tailored total solutions.”52  
B. Civil UAV Market Segments 
Although drones are traditionally categorized as military 
or non-military, the civil drone market itself is composed of 
two segments: a leisure market and a commercial market.53 
UAVs in the civil market—that is to say, leisure and 
commercial UAVs—are often operationally equivalent. Civil 
drones are defined as fixed-wing aircraft and quadcopters 
weighing less than 0.55 pounds (approximately 250 grams) 
and 55 pounds (approximately 25 kilograms), respectively.54 
As such, the regulatory boundaries between recreational and 
revenue-generating drones are sometimes blurred. Economic 
opportunity unifies each market segment, however. According 
to DJI-Accel SkyFund, for example, investments in drone 
start-ups occur in six primary areas: “1) robotics and 
intelligent machines, 2) industrial and vertical applications 
and cloud services, 3) UAV operations, services, and support, 
4) hardware components and battery technology, 5) 
navigation, obstacle intelligence, and computer vision, and 6) 
multimedia and video services and communities.”55  
Innovations and advances in these areas, in turn, serve 
three (sometimes overlapping) tiers of civil drone users: (1) 
leisure, (2) prosumer (e.g., producer-consumer), and (3) 
commercial. 
 
51 Id. at 5. 
52 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
53 See id. at 7. The FAA takes the position that all commercial and 
model aircraft (also referred to as hobby or recreational aircraft) fall under 
the heading “civil” aircraft. See also infra Section IV.B. 
54 FAA Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. § 107.3 (2017). 
55 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. 
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According to the ConvergEx Group, during the 2014 
holiday season, “drone” joined “house,” “car,” and “stock” as 
among the top four auto-fill responses on Google to the input, 
“I want to buy.”56 The consumers keying in these searches 
constitute the leisure drone segment. More specifically, the 
leisure drone market refers to amateur and do-it-yourself 
communities flying remote- and radio-controlled (“RC”) 
airplane models that are small-scale replicas of full-scale 
aircraft and helicopters. The leisure or microdrone segment 
“is showing signs of smartphone-like commoditization, where 
premium specifications are quickly brought down to mass 
market price points. Manufacturers in this market typically 
use off-the-shelf components, open-source flight control 
modules, and third party [original design manufacture].”57 
The central features of hobby or recreational drones is low cost 
and availability. They range from lightweight, “ready-to-fly,” 
electric-motor, and “toy”-class airplanes up to more 
substantial airframes with balsa wood or Styrofoam bodies 
available for purchase off-the-shelf or online from $20 to $700. 
Drone manufacturers report extraordinary revenue growth in 
the toy or hobby market segment of 300% to 500% per year.58 
From a regulatory perspective, leisure drones—i.e., drones 
flown for recreational or hobby purposes exclusively—are 
referred to as “model aircraft.”59 Their owners and operators 
 
56 See Menchie Mendoza, Drones Rank Fourth on People’s Wishlist, 
TECHTIMES (Oct. 4, 2014, 10:21 AM), 
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/17121/20141004/drones-rank-fourth-on-
holiday-wishlist-of-people-report.htm [perma.cc/3T4W-76A4] (“‘[R]eal 
people’ actually wanted to sell their kidney so they could buy a drone. The 
drone has become a highly recommended product lately, which caused 
buyers to deviate their attention from purchasing a gun.”); see also, e.g., 
Lauren Pelley, Drone Popularity Soaring this Holiday Season, TORONTO 
STAR (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.thestar.com/life/2014/12/22/drone 
_popularity_soaring_this_holiday_season.html [perma.cc/Z4BA-YH4Q]. 
57 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
58 SARAH E. KREPS, DRONES: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 117 
(2016). 
59 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
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are essentially self-regulated as a matter of law.60 In fact, 
aviation enthusiasts have participated in aeromodelling 
activities, including airplane model competitions and fly-ins, 
since the dawn of aviation. Unlike full-scale airplane owners 
and operators, members of the model airplane community 
conduct themselves not pursuant to federal aviation 
regulations, but through community-based standards and 
practices established by the Academy of Model Aeronautics 
(the “AMA”).61  According to research findings by ABI 
Research, toy and hobbyist drone shipments accounted for 
thirty percent of consumer UAV revenue in 2014, and toy and 
hobbyist UAV revenue will account for more than two-thirds 
of the $4.6 billion consumer drone market in 2025.62 
In contrast to model drones, which in a sense are nothing 
new or different from remote control toy airplanes dating back 
to the 1930s, “[p]rosumer drones are the main drivers of civil 
drone market growth.”63 Enabling “laymen to [fly and] take 
aerial shots previously impossible without expensive gear and 
[a] professional crew,” prosumer drones are “the face of the 
drone market, combin[ing] features initially unobtainable by 
the mass market with consumer-friendly user experience but 
 
60 Model aircraft operations must abide by certain rules applicable to 
all aircraft, including airspace rules, temporary flight restrictions, and 14 
C.F.R. § 91.13 (2018), which states that “[n]o person may operate an 
aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or 
property of another.” See also infra Section IV.B. 
61 Founded in 1936, the Academy of Model Aeronautics (“AMA”) is the 
world’s largest model aviation organization, with a “membership of more 
than 195,000 from every walk of life, income level and age group.” ACADEMY 
OF MODEL AERONAUTICS, SAFETY PROGRAM 25 (2014), 
http://www.modelaircraft.org/gov/docs/SafetyProgram.pdf [perma.cc/SL5E-
WDTJ]. The Indiana-based organization holds itself out as “the voice of its 
membership, providing liaison with the FAA, the Federal Communications 
Commission (‘FCC’), and other government agencies . . . . AMA also works 
with local governments, zoning boards, and parks departments to promote 
the interests of local chartered clubs.” Id. at 5. 
62 See Press Release, ABI Research, Consumer Drone Shipments to 
Exceed 90 Million Units and Generate $4.6 Billion in Revenue by 2025 (Jan. 
19, 2016), https://www.abiresearch.com/press/consumer-drone-shipments-
exceed-90-million-units-a/ [perma.cc/UG4X-LQ3P]. 
63 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
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with premium pricing.”64 Referencing a metal cylinder about 
one inch in diameter and three inches long, Anderson of 3D 
Robotics explains: 
This is a gyro sensor. It is mechanical, it costs $10,000, 
it was made in the nineties by some very talented 
ladies in an aerospace factory and hand-wound, et 
cetera. And it takes care of one axis of motion. On our 
drones we have twenty-four sensors like this. That 
would have been $10,000 each. That would have been 
$240,000 of sensors, and by the way, it would be the 
size of a refrigerator. Instead, we have a tiny little chip 
or a few tiny little chips that cost three dollars and are 
almost invisible.65 
Anderson’s point is—as the authors of Machine Platform 
Crowd: Harnessing Our Digital Future expound—that a 
Cambrian Explosion of connected devices and sensors on an 
unmanned aerial platform are possible because of “[t]he 
combination of cheap raw materials, mass global markets, 
intense competition, and large manufacturing scale 
economies.”66  
But beyond advances in miniaturization and nano-
technology, nothing may be more important to the 
commercialization and commoditization of drones and the 
emergence of a prosumer market segment than the 
smartphone and cloud computing. For example, xCraft—
whose principals appeared on ABC’s Shark Tank to tout their 
“phonedrone”—advertises its ability to give “[y]our 
smartphone access to the third dimension.”67 Anderson, in 
this spirit, calls personal drones:  
 
64 Id. 
65 Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, When the Automatons Explode: 
Sever-Less Restaurants. Field-Scanning Drones. When, Where, and How 




67 PhoneDrone, XCRAFT, http://xcraft.io/phone-drone/ [perma.cc/TV8U-
G5HQ]. 
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[The] peace dividend of the smartphone wars, which is 
to say that the components in a smartphone—the 
sensors, the GPS, the camera, the ARM core 
processors, the wireless, the memory, the battery—
which are driven by the incredible economies of scale 
and innovation machines at Apple, Google, and others, 
are available for a few dollars. They were essentially 
‘unobtainium’ ten years ago. Devices that used to be 
considered military industrial technology can be 
bought at RadioShack today.68  
In fact, 
[u]ntil the late 2000s, activities in the civilian UAV 
market had the look and feel of the PC market in the 
late 70s. It was largely a hobbyist market. There was 
no universal design, or global conglomerate 
controlling the market. Products were sold in 
electronic kit form and in limited quantities, and 
development of drones was confined to individuals and 
small, independent groups. Over time, drones have 
become smaller, cheaper, and easier to operate. 69 
 
The big break in the market occurred in 2010, when 
French company Parrot released its smartphone-
controlled consumer drone, the ‘A.R. Drone.’ 
Shenzhen-based company DJI followed in 2012, 
releasing its first consumer drone, the “Phantom,” 
with integrated camera and GPS. The two companies 
have since dominated the consumer market, each to 
date has shipped over one million drones. 70 
 
In 2015, the pace of new firms entering the drone 
market accelerated. Venture capital investments in 
UAV manufacturers and UAV application developers 
more than tripled over 2014. Today, applications for 
UAVs continue to grow with increasingly 
sophisticated functionality and a wider range of 
market segments. As component prices continue to fall 
 
68 McAfee & Brynjolfsson, supra note 65. 
69 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. 
70 Id. 
2018.2_RAVICH_FINAL 
No. 2:495] GROUNDING INNOVATION 515 
and open-source flight control software improves in 
stability and reliability, some analysts expect more 
low-cost consumer drone makers will emerge from 
China; it seems only a matter of time before consumer 
drones are as commoditized as Android 
smartphones.71 
In this context, the prosumer market “is going through the 
most rapid pace of innovation [with] new technologies in 
machine vision, image processing, range sensors, and robotics 
(autonomous control systems).”72 The primary operators in 
the prosumer market are aspirational and professional 
photographers, served by nearly 450 manufacturers from 
around the world.73 DJI, 3D Robotics, SenseFly, Yuneec, and 
Trimble are the top five most penetrated UAV makers among 
commercial UAV operators in the United States, with 
Shenzhen-based DJI penetrating almost eighty-five percent of 
the entire market.74 
Finally, separate from the prosumer drone market—
though not entirely independent—is the professional 
segment. Like the prosumer market, at the center of the 
commercial or professional drone market are devices with 
automated and aerial image and/or data collection 
capabilities. For example, in professional filmmaking and 
television, the FAA has granted exemptions allowing the 
flight of tethered drones over people in closed set operations. 
And, as recently as October 2017, CNN obtained a first-of-its-
kind commercial drone operating license from the FAA for 
operation of the Vantage Robotics Snap drone over open-air 
crowds of people at altitudes up to 150 feet.75 Similarly, ESPN 
 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 9. 
73 See List All Manufacturers, UAVGLOBAL, 
http://www.uavglobal.com/list-of-manufacturers/ [perma.cc/5YLG-FN4B]. 
74 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. 
75 Press Release, CNN Receives Breakthrough Part 107 Waiver for 
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filmed the Winter X games with a drone,76 coinciding with the 
emergence of drone racing as an increasingly popular sport 
that merges Formula 1 racing with video-gaming. In fact, the 
Drone Racing League, Inc. recently raised twenty million 
dollars in Series B funding77 in addition to early investments 
from venture capitalists backed by Miami Dolphins owner and 
RSE Ventures Founder, Stephen Ross.78 
Beyond media and entertainment, analysts posit that 
infrastructure inspection, agriculture, construction, 
insurance, telecommunication, and logistics are the likeliest 
niche markets to benefit from commercial drones. The first 
commercial drone flew over U.S. land in 2013, after the FAA 
authorized BP energy and California-based manufacturer 
AeroVironment’s request to fly the Puma AE UAV at BP’s 
Prudhoe Bay oilfield located on Alaska’s North Slope. 79 
 
76 See Sean O’Kane, ESPN is Filming the Winter X-Games with a 
Drone, VERGE (Jan. 21, 2016, 6:20 PM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2015/1/21/7868825/espn-winter-x-games-drone 
[perma.cc/W66T-M2ZX]. 
77 See Fitz Tepper, Drone Racing League Raises a $20M Series B Ahead 
of Its 2nd Season, TECHCRUNCH (June 12, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/12/drone-racing-league-raises-a-20m-
series-b-ahead-of-its-2nd-season/ [perma.cc/K2MK-C8PW]. 
78 See Emily Nonko, Developer Stephen Ross’s RSE Ventures Invests in 
Drone Racing, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/developer-stephen-rosss-rse-ventures-invests-
in-drone-racing-1439327632; see also Ian Frazier, The Trippy High-Speed 
World of Drone Racing, NEW YORKER (Feb. 5, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/the-trippy-high-speed-
world-of-drone-racing. 
79 See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Opens the Arctic to 
Commercial Small Unmanned Aircraft (Sept. 23, 2014), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=73981 [perma.cc/7FSA-S8LL]; 
see also Zaz Hollander, Drone at Prudhoe Bay Makes First FAA-Authorized 
Unmanned Commercial Flight Over Land, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, 
http://www.adn.com/article/20140610/drone-prudhoe-bay-makes-first-faa-
authorized-unmanned-commercial-flight-over-land-0 [perma.cc/7QQ8-
DHFX] (last updated Sept. 28, 2016) (“The Puma AE, manufactured by 
California-based AeroVironment, will buzz over the North Slope courtesy of 
a five-year contract with BP. The energy giant paid an undisclosed amount 
for the unmanned aircraft, with plans to use it to survey more than 200 
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Autodesk and Komatsu have invested in Skycatch to enable 
real-time analysis of the progress on construction site projects 
for its clients, including Clayco, Bechtel, and Chevron.80 And, 
in partnership with Airware, General Electric uses drones to 
inspect power lines. Altogether, “[a]ny business managing 
acres, hectares, or other large spaces can immediately 
decrease time and labor costs by using drones to blanket those 
areas, whether for testing, surveying, mapping, inspecting, or 
counting trees or boats.”81  
Of these verticals, however, ‘precision agriculture’ is 
perhaps the most significant existing application of 
commercial drones. Though precision agriculture is a new 
phenomenon in the United States, farmers have used drones 
for pesticide spraying purposes in Japan since the 1980s, and 
Yamaha has operated small, remotely piloted helicopters for 
commercial purposes since 1991. 82  Now, using high 
resolution, multispectral, thermal, and hyperspectral sensors 
on drones, the business case for agriculture drones is even 
stronger as farmers can use UAVs to estimate acreage, assess 
yield, monitor soil conditions, and survey crop health from the 
air—a data-driven approach that is far more efficient and 
cost-effective than manual, ground-based processes reliant on 
the naked eye. A Harvard Business Review case study made 
the point: Juxtaposing the survey of a 7.5-hectare construction 
site by conventional means and by a drone, two people needed 
11.5 hours to survey the site while one person needed just fifty 
minutes using a drone.83  
Advances in precision agriculture aside, the reach and 
efficiency of drones may be most exciting in terms of Internet 
service and package delivery. Facebook, for example, has 
experimented with a solar-powered, high-altitude drone—
 
miles of gravel road, well pads, a gravel pit and the 1,300 miles of pipelines 
at Prudhoe Bay.”). 
80 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. 
81 Berinato, supra note 9, at 16. 
82 See Yamaha Remotely Piloted Helicopters, YAMAHA MOTOR CORP., 
https://www.yamahamotorsports.com/motorsports/pages/precision-
agriculture [perma.cc/PT8Z-SXR6]. 
83 Anderson, supra note 4, at 13. 
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Aquila—that stays aloft for up to ninety days, offering 
Internet access to an area sixty miles wide.84  
DHL,85 Alibaba, 86 Amazon, 87 and Walmart, 88  meanwhile, 
are investigating ways to use UAVs to deliver goods via drone. 
According to a KPMG report, “[b]y 2019, the commercial small 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) sector would have revenue of 
more than US$5.1 billion—five times the revenue of the 
consumer drone market and more than twice the revenues of 
the combined military and civil market currently dominating 
the industry.”89  
Notwithstanding substantial investment and investors in 
the civil drone market, whether anyone is making money in 
the drone economy—and if so, how much—remains an open 
question. Many drone makers are startups, and are thus 
private companies for which financial data is not publicly 
 
84 Darrell Etherington, Facebook’s Aquila Drone Completes its Second 
Test Flight, Lands Well This Time, TECHCRUCH (June 29, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/29/facebooks-aquila-drone-completes-it-
second-testflight-lands-well-this-time/ [perma.cc/82PL-HPPX]. But see 
Brian Heater, As UAV Internet Proves Too Complex, Alphabet Shifts the 
Titan Team to Projects Loon and Wing, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/11/google-titan/ [perma.cc/TYV3-FGWR]. 
85 See e.g., Michael Franco, DHL Uses Completely Autonomous System 
to Deliver Consumer Goods by Drone, NEW ATLAS (May 10, 2016), 
https://newatlas.com/dhl-drone-delivery/43248/ [perma.cc/N7GM-EM9H]. 
86 See e.g., Yang Yi, Chinese e-Commerce Giant Alibaba’s Drones 
Deliver Packages to Islands, XINHUANET (Nov. 8, 2017, 8:05 AM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-11/08/c_136735278.htm 
[perma.cc/9C9G-RT9U]. 
87 See, e.g., Fahad Manjoo, Think Amazon’s Drone Delivery Idea is a 
Gimmick? Think Again, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/technology/think-amazons-drone-
delivery-idea-is-a-gimmick-think-again.html. 
88 See e.g., Jonathan Vanian, Drones May One Day Buzz Inside a 
Walmart Near You, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/03/17/walmart-drone-delivery-patent/ 
[perma.cc/WF7X-2YQM]. 
89 Next Tech: Drones Set to Take Off, KPMG (Nov. 8, 2016), 
https://home.kpmg.com/be/en/home/insights/2016/11/next-tech-drones-set-
to-take-off.html [perma.cc/K2K4-54G2] (quoting an ABI Research report). 
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available.90 Additionally, in the prosumer drone market, one 
company—DJI—dominates the market across all price ranges 
above $500 to such an extent that the second-place firm in the 
$500-$1,000 price range for UAVs—3D Robotics, which had 
had nineteen percent of the market—stopped making drones 
altogether in 2016, shifting to a software focus.91  
Other drone manufacturers are also having trouble 
keeping up. For example, France-based Parrot and China’s 
Yuneec (both of which captured seven percent of the market 
in the $500–$1,000 price range) laid off employees in 2016.92 
Lily, a startup maker of inexpensive consumer camera drones, 
ceased business without ever shipping a single drone after 
raising millions of dollars’ worth of preorders.93 Meanwhile, 
GoPro recalled its “Karma” drone only weeks after it was 
launched, following reports of malfunctions that caused it to 
lose power and fall from the sky; the Karma went on to become 
the second-best-selling drone in the United States by late 2017 
only to be discontinued due to “[a] hostile regulatory 
environment in Europe and the United States.”94 In the final 
analysis, notwithstanding the “bullish view that UAVs are an 
essential layer in the ‘trillion sensor’ world, and in the age of 
 
90 See Divya Joshi, Commercial Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Market Analysis—Industry Trends, Companies and What You Should 
Know, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2017, 6:02 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/commercial-uav-market-analysis-2017-8 
[perma.cc/P829-WV4G]. 
91 April Glaser, DJI Is Running Away with the Drone Market, RECODE 
(Apr. 14, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/4/14/14690576/ 
drone-market-share-growth-charts-dji-forecast [perma.cc/63QT-R5LV]. 
92 Id. 
93 April Glaser, What Happened to the Lily Camera Drone?, RECODE 
(Jan. 16, 2017, 2:40 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/1/16/14274254/lily-
drone-lawsuit-refunds [perma.cc/MA3G-CGRV]. 
94 Imani Moise & Chelsey Dulaney, GoPro to Cut 20% of Workforce, 
Exit Drone Market, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 8, 2018, 8:16 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/gopro-to-cut-20-of-its-workforce-exit-drone-
market-1515426190 (“GoPro also said . . . it will stop selling drones after 
clearing its existing inventory, attributing the decision to regulatory 
uncertainty. ‘A hostile regulatory environment in Europe and the United 
States will likely reduce the total addressable market in the years ahead,’ 
the company said.”). 
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IoT, plenty of regulatory, technological, and social barriers 
still exist before their wider adoption.”95 
C. Business Ethics and Regulatory Ambiguity 
In March 2017, the FAA established the Regulatory 
Consistency Communication Board to provide guidance and 
clarification to business aviation operators by clarifying 
inconsistencies related to the application of regulations.96 The 
establishment of a similar body would have been an immense 
help to startup drone firms almost a decade ago when initial 
FAA positions—along with the absence of any clearly 
controlling regulations or formal rulemaking—created great 
uncertainty in the business community. The FAA’s efforts to 
manage civil drone operators exemplified how an 
administrative agency can potentially derail a transformative 
innovation—and invite ethically ambiguous business 
behavior—in the process of effecting its regulatory mission. 
For example, the FAA actively litigated the definition of 
drone itself (as opposed to “model aircraft”).97  This was 
curious because, as detailed in Section II.B supra, drones in 
the leisure, prosumer, and commercial drone segments 
overlap substantially as a practical matter. Yet, regulators 
have imagined consequential—though seemingly arbitrary—
legal distinctions based on the operation of a drone. What is 
the difference between a model airplane flown strictly for 
hobby purposes and a drone flown by a logistics company to 
deliver goods? Practically, the answer can be nothing. But for 
regulators, the answer has been essentially everything. A 
coherent answer to this question did not present officially for 
almost a decade, creating ethical dilemmas as some 
commercial UAV operators and legal professionals took 
 
95 DRONE INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
96 See, e.g., New FAA Review Board Offers Clarity on Inconsistent 




97 See infra Section IV.B. 
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advantage of regulatory uncertainty while conservative 
commercial UAV firms, led by cautious legal counsel, 98 
remained grounded waiting hopefully for permission to fly. 
 
98 Drone lawyers are a business story unto themselves. See e.g., Monika 
Gonzalez Mesa, Drone Law Practices Taking Off—Again, DAILY BUS. REV. 
(May 8, 2017, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/almID/1202785548836 
[perma.cc/F3ZD-MRUA]; Darlene Ricker, Navigating Drone Laws Has 
Become a Growing and Lucrative Legal Niche, ABA J. (July 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/drone_law_attorneys 
[perma.cc/WL8P-N35P]; Victor Li, Firms Bet on Growth Potential of Drone 
Law, ABA J. (Oct. 27, 2014, 10:08 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/look_up_in_the_firm_its_d
rone_law/ [perma.cc/5555-ZBRJ]. Given that the FAA only enacted drone 
specific regulations in 2016, the idea that any expertise has existed or yet 
fully exists in a new and inherently cross-disciplinary subject matter known 
as “drone law” may be overstated. In a related context, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, in the context of cyberlaw, rejected the idea that the study of 
law as applied to common objects can stand alone: 
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized 
endeavors is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with 
sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still 
more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with 
the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse 
shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 
“The Law of the Horse” is doomed to be shallow and to miss 
unifying principles. Teaching 100 percent of the cases on 
people kicked by horses will not convey the law of torts very 
well. Far better for most students—better, even, for those 
who plan to go into the horse trade—to take courses in 
property, torts, commercial transactions, and the like, 
adding to the diet of horse cases a smattering of transactions 
in cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only by putting 
the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about 
commercial endeavors could one really understand the law 
about horses. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 UNIV. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207–08 (1996). In this context, the idea of legal expertise 
about a specific technology connected to the IoT raises interesting ethical 
issues of what claims lawyers can or should make in attracting clients and 
whether negative recruiting is appropriate or consistent with state bar 
rules. See, e.g., Gary Mortimer, Drone Lawyers and Kickbacks, SUAS NEWS 
(May 3, 2016), https://www.suasnews.com/2016/05/drone-lawyer-kickbacks/ 
[perma.cc/4CVD-ALKR] (“Come on FAA get on with it, you are creating a 
2018.2_RAVICH_FINAL  
522 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
While the FAA does not regulate model aircraft 
operations,99 hobby and recreational model aircraft owners 
and operators have been served for the last three decades by 
an FAA guidance document designed to promote “a good 
neighbor environment with affected communities and 
airspace users.” 100  More specifically, in 1981, the FAA 
published Advisory Circular (“AC”) 91-57, entitled “Model 
Aircraft Operating Standards.”101  It recommended where 
model aircraft operators should fly their remote controlled 
airplanes, including below 400 feet, three miles of an airport, 
and away from populated areas.102  AC 91-57 further 
suggested that hobby-type airplane operators maintain a 
sufficient distance away from populated and noise-sensitive 
areas such as parks, schools, hospitals, and churches. 103 
Additionally, the FAA suggested that hobbyists and 
recreational flyers avoid operations near spectators until the 
model aircraft being flown had been flight tested and proven 
airworthy. 104  Finally, the FAA expected hobbyists not to 
operate BVLOS, giving way to, and avoiding, full-scale 
aircraft.105 
 
market for folks to be hoodwinked.”); Other Drone Services, RUPPERCHT LAW, 
https://jrupprechtlaw.com/other-drone-services [perma.cc/TY64-WNK3] 
(“So when choosing professionals to help you, don’t hire a poser—hire a pilot. 
Why? Aviation posers will keep your operations grounded while commercial 
pilots will help it soar.”). 
99 This should not be read to mean that no federal aviation regulations 
apply to model aircraft—they do in specific and limited circumstances. See, 
e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 48 (2017) (governing registration and marking 
requirements for small unmanned aircraft). 
100 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR 
NO. 91-57, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS ¶ 1 (1981). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at ¶ 3(a), (c). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at ¶ 3(b). 
105 Id. at ¶ 3(d). 
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Significantly, AC 91-57 is advisory, not mandatory.106 It 
only encouraged “voluntary compliance.”107 Thirty-five years 
after its issuance, as drones became popular, AC 91-57 thus 
presented misunderstanding—and opportunity. Assertive (or 
unscrupulous) UAV operators looking to turn a profit took to 
the skies on the basis that AC 91-57 allowed commercial UAV 
flights in the absence of any law, regulation, or policy to the 
contrary or any law governing drones explicitly. The FAA 
reacted by issuing a notice in February 2007 intended to 
clarify that AC 91-57 only applied to modelers: 
The FAA recognizes that people and companies other 
than modelers might be flying UAS with the mistaken 
understanding that they are legally operating under 
the authority of AC 91-57. AC 91-57 only applies to 
modelers, and thus specifically excludes its use by 
persons or companies for business purposes.108 
As such, the FAA ostensibly brought commercial drones 
within its ambit, justifying its authority in terms of its mission 
“to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the 
 
106 The FAA updated AC 91-57 in September 2015 with the issuance of 
AC 91-57A. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY 
CIRCULAR NO. 91-57A, MODEL AIRCRAFT OPERATING STANDARDS ¶ 1 (2015). 
Like its predecessor advisory, the new policy states that “aero-modelers 
generally are concerned about safety and exercise good judgment when 
flying model aircraft for the hobby and recreational purposes for which they 
are intended, [and] they may share the airspace in which manned aircraft 
are operating.” However, the advisory now specifically references UAVs, 
providing that “[u]nmanned aircraft, including model aircraft, may pose a 
hazard to manned aircraft in flight and to persons and property on the 
surface if not operated safely.” Thus, the FAA has retained the authority to 
prosecute unscrupulous or careless operators: “Model aircraft operations 
that endanger the safety of the National Airspace System, particularly 
careless or reckless operations or those that interfere with or fail to give way 
to any manned aircraft may be subject to FAA enforcement action.” 
Enforcement action, then, hinges upon which regime the aircraft is 
operating within, i.e., as a recreational model aircraft or a Part 107 small 
UAS operation. Id. 
107 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 101, at ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
108 Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 
Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007). 
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world.”109 Indeed, UAVs posed unique hazards to manned and 
unmanned assets in the navigable airspace over which the 
FAA has jurisdiction. First-person view (“FPV”) capabilities 
that allow an operator to fly a drone BVLOS using a video 
stream raise safety concerns about collisions not traditionally 
associated with, for example, remote control model airplanes. 
The FAA’s safety mission did not explain why the FAA 
strictly forbade commercial drones, however. First, on its own 
terms, it was not obvious that AC 91-57 applied to drones. 
Second, the FAA did not amend or modify its policy or extend 
rules originally intended for the model aviation community to 
modern UAVs. Third, the FAA did not promulgate any 
standalone regulations with respect to civil drones (and it did 
not do so until August 2016), which it has the authority and 
competence to do. Finally, the FAA’s 2007 policy clarification 
was not the product of any formal rulemaking process, but 
only guidance supposedly clarifying a thirty-five year-old 
document that did not envision, and perhaps could not have 
envisioned, “smart” model aircraft with commercial 
applications. Most frustrating for commercial UAV operators, 
however, was the FAA’s unexplained and arbitrary policy 
allowing drones to fly for fun but not for business—even if the 
same device was used.110 
The FAA’s legal position respecting commercial drones did 
not address the reality that no differences whatsoever might 
 
109 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Mission and Responsibilities, 
https://www.faa.gov/airports/central/about_airports/CE_mission/ 
[perma.cc/439B-PCWZ] (last updated Aug. 21, 2014, 6:12 PM). 
110 The FAA has applied an accepted dictionary definition of recreation, 
defining hobby” as a “pursuit outside one’s regular occupation engaged in 
especially for relaxation” and recreation as “a refreshment of strength and 
spirits after work; a means of refreshment or diversion.” See Interpretation 
of the Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 79 Fed. Reg. 36171 (June 25, 2014), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/model_aircraft_spec_rule.pdf 
[perma.cc/3HL6-JSY3]. The FAA has opined that any operation not 
conducted strictly for hobby or recreation purposes would fall outside the 
special rule for model aircraft; and, clearly, commercial operations would 
not be hobby or recreation flights in this context. Id. Likewise, the flight of 
a model airplane in furtherance of a business, or incidental to a person’s 
business, would not be a hobby or recreation flight. Id. 
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exist between a drone flown by an amateur hobbyist and a 
drone flown by a UPS employee to deliver packages. Leisure, 
prosumer, and commercial drone owners and operators can 
and do use the exact same machine and equipment capable of 
flight BVLOS. Indeed, what is interesting and compelling 
about the drone economy is the commodification of aviation—
the availability of professional grade aerial platforms (with or 
without action cameras) to the general consumer. The line 
between model aircraft and drones is “increasingly arbitrary 
as drones have become smaller and hobbyist model aircraft 
have become more sophisticated.”111 Thus, while the FAA’s 
concern about and jurisdiction over the safety of UAV flying 
BVLOS was well founded, or at least arguable, its different 
treatment of “model” aircraft and commercial drones—
seemingly on the basis of nothing more than whether or not 
the flight was conducted for business purposes—was 
inexplicable. Yet, six years after issuing its “clarification” in 
2007,112 the FAA maintained its per se ban on commercial 
UAVs without also producing any rules or a pathway forward 
for commercial UAVs. 
In 2012, Congress addressed frustration with the FAA and 
the pent-up demand for commercial drone operations by 
enacting the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (the 
“FMRA”),113 pursuant to which Congress directed the FAA to 
produce a comprehensive set of regulations to “safely 
accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems 
into the national airspace system.”114 Importantly, Congress 
explicitly carved out an exception in section 336 of the FMRA 
for “model aircraft . . . flown strictly for hobby or recreational 
 
111 KREPS, supra note 58, at 8. 
112 Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72 
Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 13, 2007). 
113 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, H.R. Rep. No. 112-381 
(2012), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt381/pdf/CRPT-
112hrpt381.pdf [perma.cc/MG95-SD55]. 
114 See, e.g., FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-
95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. 11 (2012). 
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use.”115 In its Interpretation of the Special Rule for Model 
Aircraft dated June 18, 2014, the FAA acknowledged that 
section 336 of the FMRA disallowed it from promulgating “any 
rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft 
being developed as a model aircraft.”116 But again, the FAA 
maintained its approach that the flight of a drone for fun and 
the flight of that very same drone for a business purpose 
required different regulatory treatment. To illustrate its 
position, the FAA published a table giving examples of 
allowable hobby flying versus non-recreational flying that 

















115 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
81 Fed. Reg. 42064, 42080 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 
21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183). 
116 The FAA has interpreted the prohibition against it under section 
336 as one that must be evaluated on a rule-by-rule basis. See FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOCKET NO. FAA-2014-0396, INTERPRETATION OF 
THE SPECIAL RULE FOR MODEL AIRCRAFT 7–8, 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/media/model_aircraft_spec_rule.pdf 
[perma.cc/W4N4-3AEN]; FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. 
L. 112-95, § 336(c)(1), 126 Stat. 11 (2012) (defining “model aircraft” as “an 
unmanned aircraft that is capable of sustained flight in the atmosphere; 
flown within visual line of sight of the person operating the aircraft; and 
flown for hobby or recreational purposes”). 
117 See also FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 116, at 11 fig. 1. 
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FIGURE 1. ALLOWABLE VERSUS DISALLOWED UAV FLIGHT 
 
 
Hobby or Recreation 
 
Not Hobby or Recreation 
 
 
Flying a model aircraft 
at the local model 
aircraft club. 
 
Receiving money for 
demonstrating 
aerobatics with a model 
aircraft. 
Taking photographs 
with a model aircraft 
for personal use. 
A realtor using a model 
aircraft to photograph property 
that he is trying 
to sell and using the photos in 
the property’s real estate 
listing. 
A person photographing a 
property or event and selling 
the photos to someone else. 
Using a model aircraft to 
move a box from point to 
point without any 
kind of compensation. 
Delivering packages to people 
for a fee. 
Viewing a field to determine 
whether crops need 
water when they are grown 
for personal enjoyment. 
 
Determining whether crops 
need to be watered that are 




The fact that a model aircraft used “to move a box from 
point to point without any kind or compensation” warranted 
different regulatory treatment than a UAV used to “[d]eliver[] 
packages to people for a fee” unnecessarily targets commercial 
operations.118 And ironically, for the better part of a decade, 
the FAA imposed stringent permitting requirements on 
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many instances, had a business interest in operating safely—
while leaving amateurs with little to lose other than their 
nominal investment in an over-the-counter toy.  
And so the resulting regulatory environment has been 
aptly described as the “Wild West.”119 Opportunistic drone 
operators multiplied and gained market share by virtue of a 
debatable reading of AC 91-57 and the concomitant absence of 
drone regulations at the expense of risk-averse UAV operators 
who waited for definite regulatory approval to do business. In 
2014, for example, Fly Boys Aerials incorrectly announced on 
its website that, “[f]or the moment, commercial drones, are, 
unequivocally, legal.”120  Meanwhile, other UAV operators 
announced how easy it was to fly cinema cameras on drones: 
“All we need is a location with a large open unobstructed area, 
such as a sound stage, warehouse, sports facility, auditorium, 
etc.”121 The website for New York’s SkyCamUSA published an 
“FAA Compliance Statement” (replicated below) designed to 
reassure potential customers about the commercial 
applications of its drones:  
General Overview 
The term drone in the media tends to give people a 
certain image or idea of what a drone is. Actually 
drones come in many forms and serve many purposes 
most of them friendly. The “drones” we operate 
are friendly drones. Our drones are short range with 
about 5-10 min flight time. The only act besides flying 
 
119 Kevin C. Desouza et al., Drones and the “Wild West” of Regulatory 
Experimentation, BROOKINGS: TECHTANK (Aug. 17, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/08/17/drones-and-the-wild-
west-of-regulatory-experimentation/ [perma.cc/RX95-87U3] (“The challenge 
this rapidly developing technology is creating is well ahead of local 
government efforts to rein in excessive activities. State and local 
governments need to engage on this policy issue more proactively.”). 
120 Jason Kobeler, Commercial Drones Are Completely Legal, a Federal 
Judge Ruled, FLY BOYS AERIAL CINEMATOGRAPHY (Mar. 6, 2014, 6:51 PM), 
http://flyboysair.com/2014/03/11/commercial-drones-now-legal/ 
[perma.cc/CTA4-67US] (emphasis added). 
121 Frequently Asked Questions, TCB PRODUCTIONS, 
https://www.tcbproductions.net/portfolio [perma.cc/UKS4-87U8]. 
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they are capable of is professional aerial photography 
and video. They do not drop anything. Their usage is 
strictly used in a manner productive to respecting the 
privacy and rights of others. . . . 
We do not photograph any persons [sic] property or 
person in a selective way without authorization of the 
client. . . . Our aerial vehicles are used for good and 
evolutionary purposes only and in places that are  
safe. . . . 
Additional Information 
The remote controlled aircraft that we use sometimes 
referred to as a drone is a low altitude, close range, 
open space hobby flyer and flown only in a safe area 
and does not operate near any airports, aircraft or 
violate any FAA regulations. The remote controlled 
helicopter is NOT a Drone or UAV or autonomous in 
anyway [sic] and is flown by hand only within visual 
line of sight of the operator always in a safe location 
and never near any airport or aircraft. . . .122 
This early statement was made up; the FAA had not 
authored or sanctioned any such compliance statement. These 
and other commercial UAV activities were not necessarily 
illegal or unethical. However, as one observer put it: “The 
horse has left the stable. Now is not the time [for the FAA] to 
bolt the barn and stand guard over an empty stall.”123 
While the FAA’s hard, rule-less stance relating to 
commercial drones created legal and practical ambiguity, 
several organizations interested in operating drones took the 
long view by working with regulators to secure permission to 
 
122 FAA Compliance Statement, SKYCAMUSA, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160117095311/http://www.skycamusa.com:8
0/legal.shtml (statement available on Jan. 17, 2016). SkyCamUsa’s 
statement has been repeatedly revised in light of FAA activity involving 
UAVs. For the most recent version, see FAA Compliance Statement, 
SKYCAMUSA, http://www.skycamusa.com/legal.shtml [perma.cc/G9HM-
2C2H].  
123 Speed and Transparency Needed for Civil UAS Use, 176 AVIATION 
WK. & SPACE TECH., May 26/June 2, 2014, at 74. 
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fly. The Motion Picture Association of America (the “MPAA”), 
for example, was among the first organizations to emphasize 
the tangible economic benefits of UAVs in the film industry 
and urged the FAA to make an exception to allow filmmakers 
to fly in the national airspace. 124  Given existing aerial-
photography expertise in the industry, coupled with the fact 
that film sets are usually closed environments, the FAA was 
open to accommodating the MPAA. 125  As such, the FAA 
proceeded on a case-by-case basis—a progressive step, but one 
that left the industry fragmented operationally: 
Every time a filmmaker wants to shoot in the United 
States using a drone, they have to ink a one-time deal 
with the authorities for permission. In other countries 
where the rules are more lax, the checks may be 
weaker or nonexistent. And that’s led to an explosion 
in the international market for unmanned aerial 
footage.126 
For operators outside the MPAA, obtaining permission 
from the FAA seemed draconian. For instance, journalism 
programs at the University of Missouri, the University of 
Nebraska, and the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at 
 
124 See Brendan Sasso, Hollywood Wants Drones for Filmmaking, THE 
HILL (Jan. 25, 2013, 11:00 AM) http://thehill.com/policy/technology/279235-
hollywood-wants-drones-for-movie-making [perma.cc/4D8U-CV2U]. 
125 See, e.g., Alex Brown, Hollywood Producers Want to Use Drones to 
Film Their Movies, NAT’L J.: TECH. (June 2, 2014, 1:02 PM) 
http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/hollywood-producers-want-to-use-
drones-to-film-their-movies-20140602. In 2014, the FAA granted regulatory 
exemptions to six aerial photo and video production companies—Astraeus 
Aerial, Aerial MOB, LLC, HeliVideo Productions, LLC, Pictorvision Inc, RC 
Pro Productions Consulting, LLC dba Vortex Aerial, and Snaproll Media, 
LLC— “the first step to allowing the film and television industry the use of 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System.” Press 
Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Transportation Secretary Fox 
Announces FAA Exemptions for Commercial UAS Movie and TV Production 
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/ 
news_story.cfm?cid=TW251&newsId=17194 [perma.cc/52HF-DF6Z]. 
126 See Brian Fung, It’s a Bird! It’s a Plane! It’s a Drone that Makes 
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Columbia University launched drone journalism courses.127 
However, such programs were chilled when, for example, the 
FAA grounded students in the Missouri program who flew a 
UAV over a prairie for a story without first obtaining agency 
permission in advance.128 
In all, the FAA’s ex-ante, one-size-fits-all ban on 
commercial drones was ineffective and sometimes flouted. An 
editorial in Aviation Week and Space Technology noted: 
[T]he agency’s interaction with a frustrated civil UAS 
community is limited to wagging a finger at unsafe 
operations, slapping cease-and-desist orders on 
“illegal” operators and fines on reckless fliers, and 
defending those bans and fines against legal 
challenges. All the while, the FAA hides in the 
labyrinth of rulemaking when asked important 
questions.129 
This set of circumstances lasted for approximately nine 
years, after which the FAA codified the first set of uniform, 
national drone regulations that broadly permitted civil UAV 
operations with certain exceptional operations to be allowed 
on a case-by-case waiver basis—e.g., night operations, 
BVLOS, operations over people. And as such, the initial 
approach that regulators took with respect to commercial 
drones for almost a decade—namely, ex-ante prohibitions and 
ex-post allowances—impeded the development of a 
commercial UAV market and turned out to be the exact 
opposite of the regulatory framework that regulators 
ultimately would establish. Indeed, current civil UAV 
 
127 See Alex Davies, The FAA Has Shut Down 2 Journalism School 
Drone Programs, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2013, 5:48 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/faa-ends-journalism-school-drone-use-
2013-8; see also Leslie Kaufman & Ravi Somaiya, Drones Offer Journalists 
a Wider View, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/business/media/drones-offer-
journalists-a-wider-view.html. 
128 See Kaufman & Somaiya, supra note 127. 
129 Speed and Transparency Needed for Civil UAS Use, supra note 123, 
at 74. 
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regulations (i.e., Part 107130 ) establish ex-ante allowances 
subject to ex-post enforcement—a scheme that would have 
worked many years ago.  
The remainder of this Article will focus on the specific 
challenges that aviation regulators have had and are having 
with respect to innovations in unmanned aviation. This 
analysis may apply generally to the ways in which authorities 
should think about emerging technologies in the IoT.131 
III. THE UAV LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
The June 10, 1956 edition of the Van Nuys (Calif.) News 
said that the three most important things about real estate 
are location, location, location.132 Nowhere is this business 
precept more important—from a legal point of view—than in 
the context of commercial drones. As detailed in Stuart 
Banner’s Who Owns the Sky: The Struggle to Control Airspace 
from the Wright Brothers On,133 since approximately the mid- 
to late 1800s, manned aviation has disrupted the Roman 
concept that one who owns land also owns the skies above 
 
130 Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. pt. 107 (2018). 
131 In future work, the author intends to consider the possibility that 
regulation is virtually unnecessary in this area of law and that insurance 
requirements or tort law can control the safety issues. 
132 See e.g., William Safire, Location, Location, Location, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG. (June 26, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/magazine/28FOB-onlanguage-t.html. 
133 See STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY? THE STRUGGLE TO 
CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON 23 (2008); see also 
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946) (“It is ancient doctrine 
that at common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the 
universe—Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has 
no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway, as Congress has 
declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject 
the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. 
To recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, 
seriously interfere with their control and development in the public interest, 
and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just 
claim.”). 
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it.134 Laws established at the outset of the jet age set 500 feet 
above ground level as the extent of private property ownership 
(at least in urban areas). 135  But, now, innovations in 
unmanned aviation and the nearly ubiquitous opportunity to 
fly at low altitudes are impacting common law conceptions of 
property and tort law as the federal government has begun to 
assert authority over all airspace “above the grass.” For 
startup commercial UAV firms, therefore, the practical 
question of who controls the sky may be as important and 
uncertain as the academic question that asks who owns the 
sky. This Part addresses these questions, first, by explaining 
the threshold legal principles or federalism and preemption 
involved in the regulation of drones, and, second, by 
overviewing common law matters impacting and impacted by 
the operation of civil and commercial UAVs. 
A. Federalism and Preemption 
The preemptive power of the federal government over state 
and local authorities—and to a lesser extent, state authorities 
over local officials—in matters involving the national airspace 
is a cornerstone of aviation law.136 As a starting point, the 
 
134 The Roman doctrine of cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelom— “for 
whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven . . .”—controlled air rights 
until the mid-1940s, when private property rights were cut down to “the 
immediate reaches above the land,” a phrase never linked to any specific 
altitude. See Causby, 328 U.S. at 260–61, 266 (1946). 
135 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989). 
136 In aviation and non-aviation context, courts have recognized two 
types of preemption: express and implied. Express preemption exists when 
the language of a federal law communicates an explicit intent by Congress 
to preempt state law. Whether a federal law preempts a state law is a 
question of congressional intent. Thus, if Congress intends to govern an 
issue exclusively it need only say so, as it has done in various areas. Implied 
preemption consists of “conflict preemption” and “field preemption.” The 
former is said to exist either when compliance with both the federal and 
state laws is a physical impossibility, or when the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress. The latter exists when a court determines that a 
federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive that Congress must have intended 
to leave no room for a state to supplement it. Courts generally understand 
field preemption to mean that federal law “thoroughly occupies” the 
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federal government, through the FAA, has exclusive and 
sovereign jurisdiction over the NAS pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Congress preempted 
state and territorial regulation in the area of aviation safety 
by enacting the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.137 A single, 
uniform system of regulation was thought to be vital to 
increasing air safety, as was centralizing in a single authority 
and administrator the power to frame rules for the safe and 
efficient use of the nation’s airspace. The reasoning 
underlying this was plain: 
[A]viation is unique among transportation industries 
in its relation to the federal government—it is the only 
one whose operations are conducted almost wholly 
within federal jurisdiction, and are subject to little or 
no regulation by States or local authorities. Thus, the 
federal government bears virtually complete 
responsibility for the promotion and supervision of 
this industry in the public interest.138 
Whether and how to extend this legal precedent to the 
operation of drones flying beneath the NAS is indefinite, 
however.139 
 
“legislative field” in question, e.g., the field of aviation safety. Field 
preemption analysis has come up frequently before courts, particularly in 
the arena of aviation safety. The Supreme Court has emphasized a 
presumption against preemption. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 421 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough I agree 
that the plain language of [the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978] pre-empts 
any state law that relates directly to rates, routes, or services, the 
presumption against pre-emption of traditional state regulation counsels 
that we not interpret [this law] to pre-empt every traditional state 
regulation that might have some indirect connection with, or relationship 
to, airline rates, routes or services unless there is some indication that 
Congress intended that result.”). 
137 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–49105). See also Abdullah v. 
Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999). 
138 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 368 (citing S. REP. NO. 85-1811, at 5 (1958)). 
139 See generally Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42064, 42182 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified 
at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183) (citing Minimum 
Safe Altitudes: General, 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (2018)) (“[W]ith limited 
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Adding doubt to this state of affairs is the FAA’s statement 
that, with respect to drones, it would, “address preemption 
issues on a case-by-case basis rather than doing so in a rule of 
general applicability.”140  As to the regulation of “flight 
altitude, flight paths; operational bans; or any regulation of 
the navigable airspace,” the FAA has declined to say whether 
local law is prohibited, stating instead that “consultation with 
the FAA is recommended.”141 Consequently, a patchwork of 
drone-centered statutes and ordinances has filled a regulatory 
vacuum and pitted federal and state laws against each 
other.142 
Indeed, UAV laws are not centralized like those that have 
defined the relationship between the federal government and 
state governments for manned aviation over the last half 
century. Several states have enacted drone specific laws in the 
absence of—or sometimes concurrently with—federal law.143 
Not every state has enacted UAV related legislation, but as of 
2018, every state had at least considered UAV legislation.144 
In the 2017 legislative session, for example, at least thirty-
eight states considered UAV-related legislation.145 
 
exception, the small unmanned aircraft may not fly higher than 400 feet 
AGL, which further separates that aircraft operation from most manned-
aircraft operations in the NAS.”). 
140 Id. at 42119. 
141 Id. at 42194. 
142 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones 
and the Things They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 59 (2013) (arguing that 
the “complex space of privacy regulation is best left to the states”). 
143 TIMOTHY M. RAVICH, COMMERCIAL DRONE LAW: DIGEST OF U.S. AND 
GLOBAL UAS RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 259–333 (2017). 
144 AMANDA ESSEX, TAKING OFF: STATE UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
POLICIES 5 (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/ 
transportation/TAKING_OFF-STATE_%20UNMANNED_%20AIRCRAFT 
_SYSTEMS_%20POLICIES_%20%28004%29.pdf [perma.cc/J8KD-4T6B]. 
145 Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/ 
current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx [perma.cc/N8R9-
4NY2]. Eighteen states, including Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia and 
Wyoming, passed twenty-four pieces of legislation during that time. Id. 
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Undoubtedly, the validity of some of these laws will not be 
known for certain until, or unless, tested in federal courts. 
 




Interestingly, the force and effect that these laws might 
have is indefinite as several state legislatures have diluted 
their own laws by explicitly subordinating them to federal 
authority. Specifically, several states that have enacted UAV 
laws have expressed an intention not to interfere with federal 
law.147 For example, Alaska’s drone laws provide a stand-
 
146 ESSEX, supra note 144, at 13. 
147 For example, Arizona state law provides that “[e]xcept as 
authorized by law, a city, town or county may not enact or adopt any 
ordinance, policy or rule that relates to the ownership or operation of an 
unmanned aircraft system or otherwise engage in the regulation of the 
ownership or operation of an unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft 
system.” Unlawful Operation of Model or Unmanned Aircraft; State 
Preemption; Classification; Definitions, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3729 
(2016). Maryland codified a law that vests the state government with 
exclusive authority to regulate the testing or operation of unmanned 
aircraft systems, preempting the authority of counties and municipalities. 
Laws Governing the Testing and Operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-301 (West 2017). In contrast to these 
jurisdictions, in North Carolina a unit of local government has explicit 
authority to adopt an ordinance to regulate the use of the local government’s 
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alone section entitled “Conformity to Federal Law,” noting 
that state aviation authorities “may not adopt a regulation, 
order, or standard that is inconsistent or contrary to any act 
of the Congress of the United States or regulations 
promulgated or standards established.”148  The law 
additionally provides that, “[a] regulation, order, or standard 
may not be adopted that duplicates any current rules or 
regulations issued by a federal agency, or that applies to 
aircraft, airports, or air navigation facilities owned or 
operated by the federal government.” 149  No court has yet 
decided if this sort of language is consistent with existing 
federal law or whether existing federal aviation law would 
have priority over state laws respecting drones.150  
As federal and state UAV authorities jockey for position,151 
local authorities are beginning to regulate the operation of 
 
property for the launch and recovery of UAS. Regulation of Launch and 
Recovery Sites, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-300.2(b) (West 2014). 
148 Conformity to Federal Law, ALASKA STAT. § 02.15.030 (West 1949). 
149 Id. 
150 The preemption contest between federal and state regulators also 
plays out between federal authorities and local lawmakers. For example, as 
previously discussed, the FAA contends that a city ordinance that bans 
anyone from operating UAV within the city limits, within the airspace of 
the city, or within certain distances of landmarks should be coordinated 
with the FAA as should operational UAS restrictions on flight altitude, 
flight path, operational bans, or any regulation of the navigable airspace. 
Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 42064, 42194 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 
61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183). According to a New York Times report, a 
Miami-Dade County’s Ordinance that did just that ran afoul of this 
regulatory position. See MIAMI, FLA., ORDINANCES no. 13581, § 37-12 (2015). 
Lawyers from the FAA reportedly called the city council to make clear that 
the federal agency had ultimate control over airspace. See Cecilia Kang, 
F.A.A. Drone Laws Start to Clash with Stricter Local Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/technology/faa-drone-laws-
start-to-clash-with-stricter-local-rules.html. 
151 In 2016, section 2142 of the Senate’s proposed Federal Aviation 
Administration Reauthorization Act set out to broadly preempt both states 
and cities from enacting laws related to the design, manufacture, testing, 
licensing, registration, certification, operation, or maintenance of UAS, 
including airspace, altitude, flight paths, equipment or technology 
requirements, purpose of operations, and pilot, operator, and observer 
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drones to the displeasure of state lawmakers.152 For example, 
in 2014, the town of Deer Trail, Colorado, unsuccessfully 
attempted to authorize the issuance of licenses to allow 
residents to hunt and shoot down drones.153 In November 
2015, Chicago became the first major American city to pass a 
drone ordinance, reasoning that, “[n]ot withstanding [sic] 
those proposals being discussed in Washington, Chicago 
simply needs local laws in place to authorize the city to take 
action against those who operate drones recklessly and 
threaten public safety.”154 Alongside these initiatives, North 
Carolina gave units of local government explicit authority to 
adopt ordinances to regulate the use of the local government’s 
property for the launch and recovery of UAS.155 
 
qualifications, training, and certification. Federal Aviation Administration 
Reauthorization Act of 2016, S.2658, 114th Cong. (2016). See also NAT’L 
LEAGUE CITIES, CITIES AND DRONES: WHAT CITIES NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (UAVS) 17 (2016). The proposed law also 
sought to prohibit states and cities from including drones in laws related to 
nuisance, voyeurism, privacy, data security, harassment, reckless 
endangerment, wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage. Id. 
Although this preemption language was not included in the final 
reauthorization act approved by Congress, Congress may revisit the issue 
in the future. Id. 
152 To access a broad listing of county and municipal UAS legislative 
proposals see SYRACUSE UNIV. INST. FOR NAT’L SECURITY & 
COUNTERTERRORISM, DOMESTICATING THE DRONE: EVALUATING PRIVACY 
POLICY IN THE USE OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES WITHIN THE US, 
http://uavs.insct.org/local-regulation/ [perma.cc/FET4-P2PL]. 
153 See Katy Steinmetz, Colorado Town Won’t Issue Drone-Hunting 
Licenses, TIME (Apr. 2, 2014), http://time.com/46327/drone-hunting-deer-
trail/ [perma.cc/LHA8-5SBC]; see also A. Michael Froomkin & P. Zak 
Colangelo, Self-Defense Against Robots and Drones, 48 CONN. L. REV. 1 
(2015); Cyrus Farivar, Man Shoots Down Neighbor’s Hexacopter in Rural 
Drone Shotgun Battle, ARS TECHNIA (June 27, 2015, 1:05 PM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/06/man-shoots-downs-neighbors-
hexacopter-in-rural-drone-shotgun-battle/ [perma.cc/XY2T-BAPZ]. 
154 Fran Spielman, Drone Regulations Fly with City Council, CHI. SUN 
TIMES (Nov. 18, 2015, 12:21 PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics 
/drone-regulations-fly-with-city-council/ [perma.cc/E8MF-ALGX]. 
155 Regulation of Launch and Recovery Sites, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
15A-300.2(b) (West 2014). 
2018.2_RAVICH_FINAL 
No. 2:495] GROUNDING INNOVATION 539 
Some states have cut off the ability of cities, municipalities, 
and local governments to regulate UAVs altogether. They 
have done so by enacting state statutes with preemptive effect 
over local UAV rules. Broadly, the power of a state to preempt 
and subordinate local law—referred to as Dillon’s Rule—
derives from a narrow interpretation of a local government’s 
authority, in which a local or municipal government (i.e., a 
“substate”) may engage in an activity only if it is specifically 
sanctioned by the state government.156  For example, in 
December 2017, New Jersey lawmakers, in an effort to 
preempt local ordinances that may vary, advanced laws 
criminalizing the operation of a drone while drunk.157  
A number of other states have exerted their authority over 
local UAV proposals and rules: 
• Alaska state law preempts local law with respect 
to images captured by drone, stating, “[a] 
municipality may not adopt an ordinance that 
permits the release of images captured by an 
 
156 NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A 
STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS: 2018 UPDATE, https://www.nlc.org/sites/default 
/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf 
[perma.cc/9K92-6KT2]. See also JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911). The following thirty-
nine states employ Dillon’s Rule to all municipalities: Arizona, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Eight states employ the 
rule for only certain municipalities: Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana and Tennessee. The only exception to the exclusive 
selection of home rule or Dillon’s Rule is Florida, which employs home rule 
but reserves taxing authority for the state. See Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. et 
al., Is Home Rule the Answer? Clarifying the Influence of Dillon’s Rule on 
Growth Management 1 (Brookings Inst. Ctr. on Urban and Metro. Pol’y, 
Discussion Paper, 2003), https://www.brookings.edu/research/is-home-rule-
the-answer-clarifying-the-influence-of-dillons-rule-on-growth-
management/ [perma.cc/MS5X-BA2J]. 
157 Michael Catalini, Don’t Drink and Drone: New Jersey Considering 
New Law, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/new-
jersey-considers-barring-operating-a-drone-while-drunk/ (last modified 
Dec. 5, 2017, 1:22 PM). 
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unmanned aircraft system in a manner 
inconsistent with Alaska Stat. 18.65.903,” which 
governs the retention of images.158 
• Arizona state law provides that “[e]xcept as 
authorized by law, a city, town or county may not 
enact or adopt any ordinance, policy, or rule that 
relates to the ownership or operation of an 
unmanned aircraft system or otherwise engage in 
the regulation of the ownership or operation of an 
unmanned aircraft or unmanned aircraft system. 
Any ordinance, policy or rule that violates this 
subsection, whether enacted or adopted by the 
city, town or county before or after [the effective 
dates of this section], is void.”159 
• Maryland codified a law that vests the state 
government with exclusive authority to regulate 
the testing or operation of unmanned aircraft 
systems, preempting the authority of counties and 
municipalities: “Only the State may enact a law or 
take any other action to prohibit, restrict, or 
regulate the testing or operation of unmanned 
aircraft systems in the State.”160 As such, the law 
“(1) preempts the authority of a county or 
municipality to prohibit, restrict, or regulate the 
testing or operation of unmanned aircraft 
systems; and (2) supersedes any existing law or 
ordinance of a county or municipality that 
prohibits, restricts, or regulates the testing or 
operation of unmanned aircraft systems.”161 
• In 2016, Rhode Island enacted its first drone law, 
giving the state and the Rhode Island Airport 
Cooperation exclusive authority to regulate “any 
object capable of flying that is remotely controlled 
and flies autonomously through software 
controlled flight plans embedded in the object’s 
system by a global-position system, commonly 
 
158 Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, ALASKA STAT. 
§ 29.35.146 (West 2014). 
159 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3729 (2016). 
160 MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 14-301 (West 2015). 
161 Id. 
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known as unpiloted aerial vehicles, remotely 
piloted aircraft, drones, or unmanned aircraft 
systems.” But all of this may be for naught as the 
law concludes by stating that “[i]f federal law 
preempts any provision of this chapter, that 
provision shall not apply.”162 
• No locality in Virginia is permitted to regulate the 
use of a privately owned, unmanned aircraft 
system within its boundaries.163 
In respect of the foregoing, the FAA issued a fact sheet 
titled “State and Local Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS)” in December 2015.164 The fact sheet provides 
that “[s]tate and local restrictions affecting UAS operations 
should be consistent with the extensive federal statutory and 
regulatory framework pertaining to control of the airspace, 
flight management and efficiency, air traffic control, aviation 
 
162 An Act Relating to Aeronautics—Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle 
Regulation, 2016 R.I. Pub. Laws Ch. 16-256; An Act Relating to 
Aeronautics—Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle Regulation, 2016 R.I. Pub. Laws Ch. 
16-261. 
163 Local Regulation of Certain Aircraft, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-926.3 
(2016). See also Letter from Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, 
Commonwealth of Virginia, to Scott A. Surovell, Member, House of 
Delegates (July 13, 2015) (“[I]t is my opinion that the federal Deregulation 
Act expressly preempts state or local regulation of the routes, rates, and 
services of commercial drones used to transport property across state lines. 
Furthermore, the Aviation Act and FMRA preempt state and local 
regulation of drone safety, operational standards, and airspace 
designations, including particular issues relating to drone certification, 
training, and licensure. There are certain exceptions to federal preemption 
. . . States remain free to enact laws relating to drones if the laws fall outside 
the scope of the Aviation Act and FMRA and do not conflict with other 
federal laws or regulations. In particular, states may regulate small drones 
that are exempted from federal regulation under the FMRA, and they may 
also enact laws for drones that address issues of privacy and property and 
also criminal offenses, so long as the laws do not conflict with the language 
or purpose of any existing federal aviation law.”). 
164 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STATE AND 
LOCAL REGULATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) FACT SHEET 
(2015), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/uas_regulations_policy/media/ 
uas_fact_sheet_final.pdf [perma.cc/LQV6-V6CA] [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
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safety, navigational facilities, and the regulation of aircraft 
noise at its source.”165 In its fact sheet, the FAA noted: 
Substantial air safety issues are raised when state or 
local governments attempt to regulate the operation 
or flight of aircraft. If one or two municipalities 
enacted ordinances regulating UAS in the navigable 
airspace and a significant number of municipalities 
followed suit, fractionalized control of the navigable 
airspace could result. In turn, this “patchwork quilt” 
of differing restrictions could severely limit the 
flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and flight 
patterns, and ensuring safety and an efficient air 
traffic flow. A navigable airspace free from 
inconsistent state and local restrictions is essential to 
the maintenance of a safe and sound air 
transportation system.166 
 
165 Id. at 1. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. 
REV. 155 (2015); Troy A. Rule, Take Cover Against This Drone Attack, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2016, 6:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/take-cover-
against-this-drone-attack-1459291069 (opposing a proposed law that would 
have made the FAA “the nation’s sole drone regulator” because “[i]f the 
provision [were] signed into law, drone operators with FAA authorizations 
[would] be free to ignore state and local drone-use restrictions” and 
“[l]andowners and local governments [would] have a difficult time keeping 
unwelcome drones out of backyards and neighborhoods”). What role states 
might play in regulating drones is unclear. The FAA’s historic territoriality 
and ongoing practice of overriding and preempting state and local laws in 
the UAV space renders dubious proposals calling for a more flexible 
approach in federal-state dealings with respecting to emerging technologies. 
Compare supra notes 150 and 151 and accompanying text, with Sara E. 
Light, Advisory Nonpreemption, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 325, 344 (2017) 
(positing the concept of “advisory nonpreemption” whereby an agency issues 
a “public statement in policy guidance in response to a federalism 
disruption—before it initiates any notice-and-comment rulemaking—about 
how it interprets its delegated authority from Congress, and whether its 
interpretation gives it the power to regulate the innovation”). 
166 FACT SHEET, supra note 164, at 2 (citing Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 
508 F.3d 464 (9th Cir. 2007), French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1989), Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where 
Congress occupies an entire field . . . even complimentary state regulation 
is impermissible. Field preemption reflects a congressional decision to 
foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to federal 
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Although the FAA’s fact sheet is not a formal rule, courts 
have deferred to it as the FAA’s interpretation of its own rule. 
In Singer v. City of Newton, for example, a federal judge 
relying on the FAA’s fact sheet struck down an ordinance 
passed by the City of Newton, Massachusetts that required 
drone owners to register their devices and prohibited them 
from flying out of the operator’s line of sight or in certain areas 
without permit or express permission. 167  The ordinance, 
designed to protect the privacy interests of Newton residents, 
was “intended to be read and interpreted in harmony with all 
relevant rules and regulations of the Federal Aviation 
Administration, and any other federal, state and local laws 
and regulations.”168 The ordinance specifically: (1) required 
the registration of all drones (i.e., model and commercial); (2) 
prohibited pilotless aircraft flight below 400 feet over any 
private property without the express written permission of the 
property owner; (3) prohibited pilotless aircraft flight over 
public property without prior permission from the city; and (4) 
banned the flight of pilotless aircraft “at a distance beyond the 
visual line of sight of the Operator.”169 Under the doctrine of 
conflict preemption, the court found that federal law 
preempted the Newton ordinance.170  
As the Singer court reasoned, the FAA has exclusive 
jurisdiction over UAV operations in the NAS because 
Congress vested it with authority to regulate the areas of 
airspace use, management and efficiency, air traffic control, 
safety, navigational facilities, and aircraft noise at its 
source. 171  Indeed, Congress directed the FAA to “develop 
 
standards.”), and Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386–
87 (1992)). 
167 Singer v. City of Newton, No. 17-10071-WGY, 2017 WL 4176477 (D. 
Mass. Sept. 21, 2017). 
168 Id. at *2. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at *6–8. See also John Goglia, What’s the Status of Local Drone 
Ordinances after the Singer Decision?, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017, 11:10 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2017/09/25/whats-the-status-of-
local-drone-ordinances-post-singer-decision/ [perma.cc/7FJQ-3G6J]. 
171 FACT SHEET, supra note 164, at 1 (“Why the Federal Framework”) 
(citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 40103, 44502, and 44701–35). 
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plans and policy for the use of the navigable airspace and 
assign by regulation or order the use of the airspace necessary 
to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of 
airspace.”172 Congress also directed the FAA to ‘prescribe air 
traffic regulations on the flight of aircraft (including 
regulations on safe altitudes)’ for navigating, protecting, and 
identifying aircraft; protecting individuals and property on 
the ground; using the navigable airspace efficiently; and 
preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and 
land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne 
objects.”173 The FAA’s position—that its regulatory authority 
over matters pertaining to aviation safety ensures the 
maintenance of a safe and sound air transportation system 
and of navigable airspace free from inconsistent restriction—
is well supported in the law.174 Naturally, then, the FAA’s 
final operational rule for routine commercial use of small 
unmanned aircraft—codified at Part 107—is predicated upon 
these broad regulatory powers respecting aviation safety.  
Yet, notwithstanding its expansive and exclusive authority 
over the NAS, the FAA has specifically declined to address 
whether its authority with respect to drones preempts state 
and local UAV laws and ordinances. Instead, the preemptive 
effect of Part 107 depends upon the purpose and terms of the 
state law and its relationship to any applicable federal law. 
The Preamble to Part 107, in fact, identifies several matters 
over which local regulation could be appropriate: 
• This rule [Part 107] does not address preemption 
issues because those issues necessitate a case 
specific analysis that is not appropriate in a rule 
of general applicability. The FAA notes, however, 
that state governments have historically been able 
 
172 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(1)). 
173 Id. at 1–2 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b)(2)). 
174 Id. at 2 (“A consistent regulatory system for aircraft and use of 
airspace has the broader effect of ensuring the highest level of safety for all 
aviation operations.”). 
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to regulate the takeoffs and landings of aircraft 
within their state boundaries.175 
• The FAA is not persuaded that including a 
preemption provision in the final rule is 
warranted at this time. Preemption issues 
involving small UAS necessitate a case-specific 
analysis that is not appropriate in a rule of general 
applicability. Additionally, certain legal aspects 
concerning small UAS use may be best addressed 
at the state or local level. For example, state law 
and other legal protections for individual privacy 
may provide recourse for a person whose privacy 
may be affected through another person’s use of a 
UAS.176 
• Adjudicating private property rights are beyond 
the scope of this rule. However, the provisions of 
this rule are not the only set of laws that may 
apply to the operation of a small UAS. With regard 
to property rights, trespassing . . . may be 
addressed by State and local trespassing laws.177 
• [UAS operators] who do not have the facility 
owner’s permission to operate a UAS near or over 
the perimeter or interior of amusement parks and 
attractions may be violating state or local 
trespassing laws.178 
• State law and other legal protections may already 
provide recourse for a person whose individual 
privacy, data privacy, private property rights, or 
intellectual property rights may be implicated by 
a remote pilot’s civil or public use of a UAS.179 
• State law and other legal protections for 
individual privacy may provide recourse for a 
person whose privacy may be affected through 
another person’s use of a UAS.180 
 
175 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
81 Fed. Reg. 42064, 42189 (June 28, 2016) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 
21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183). 
176 Id. at 42194. 
177 Id. at 42119. 
178 Id. at 42132. 
179 Id. at 42192. 
180 Id. at 42194. 
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• Substantial air safety issues are implicated when 
state or local governments attempt to regulate the 
operation of aircraft in the national airspace. The 
Fact Sheet provides examples of State and local 
laws affecting UAS for which consultation with 
the FAA is recommended and those that are likely 
to fall within State and local government 
authority. For example, consultation with FAA is 
recommended when state or local governments 
enact operational UAS restrictions on flight 
altitude, flight paths; operational bans; or any 
regulation of the navigable airspace.181 
Ultimately, commercial UAS firms, together with their 
investors and clients, currently operate in an evolving legal 
environment in which there exist different and sometimes 
disharmonious rules at the national, state, and local levels.182 
B. New Drone Business Issues and Common Law 
Resilience  
While the national government frequently prevails on 
questions of federalism and preemption discussed in Section 
III.A, supra, the FAA has stipulated that state and local 
authorities have “police powers” in five areas that are 
generally not subject to federal regulation: land use, zoning, 
privacy, trespass, and law enforcement.183 In this context, 
 
181 Id. 
182 President Donald Trump issued an executive order in late 2017 that 
created a UAS Integration Pilot Program designed for state, local, and tribal 
governments to accelerate the safe integration of UAS operations and 
allowance of more advanced UAS operations, such as beyond visual line-of-
sight or over people. See, e.g., Jonathan Vanian, Everything to Know about 
President Donald Trump’s New Drone Program, FORTUNE (Oct. 25, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/10/25/donald-trump-drone-program/ 
[perma.cc/C9NW-ATC9]. 
183 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
81 Fed. Reg. at 42194. The federal government’s exclusive sovereignty of 
the national airspace does not preclude states or municipalities from 
passing any valid aviation regulations. See Singer v. City of Newton, No. 17-
10071-WGY, 2017 WL 4176477, at *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing 
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many state and local governments have their own sets of UAV 
laws, including reckless endangerment laws, a requirement 
for law enforcement to obtain a warrant prior to using a UAV 
for surveillance, a prohibition on the use of UAVs for 
voyeuristic purposes, a ban on the deployment of UAVs for 
hunting or fishing, and a bar on the weaponization of 
UAVs.184 Meanwhile, the ways in which drones infringe on 
traditional property and privacy rights occupies scholarly and 
policy-based discussions about drones.185 But, the key civil 
aspects of the common law that give insight into the emerging 
business law dimension of civil drones are underdiscussed.  
Drone owners, operators, manufacturers, and even 
regulators themselves are prone to the usual variety of 
consumer protection, class action, and breach of contract 
disputes in which traditional, non-IoT products are at issue. 
Some of the most interesting examples include: 
• Deceptive business practices. In 2015, startup 
Lily Robotics gained the attention of millions of 
viewers—and $15 million in investment and $34 
million in preorders—after posting a gripping 
video showing a camera drone that, among other 
things, automatically followed its operator. But, in 
2017, the company shut down before shipping any 
of its $499 devices. The San Francisco District 
Attorney filed a civil consumer protection suit 
 
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 
U.S. 590, 595 (1954)). 
184 See TIMOTHY M. RAVICH, COMMERCIAL DRONE LAW: DIGEST OF U.S. 
AND GLOBAL UAS RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES ch. 10 (2017); see also 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 
FOR SUSPECTED UNAUTHORIZED UAS OPERATIONS (2017), 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/law_enforcement/media/FAA_UAS-
PO_LEA_Guidance.pdf [perma.cc/4PQX-7H68]. 
185 See, e.g., Jeramie D. Scott, Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s 
Obligation to Respond to the Privacy Risks, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767 
(2017); Hillary B. Farber, Keep Out! The Efficacy of Trespass, Nuisance and 
Privacy Torts as Applied to Drones, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359 (2017); Jake 
Laperruque, Preventing An Air Panopticon: A Proposal for Reasonable Legal 
Restrictions on Aerial Surveillance, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 705 (2017); Timothy 
T. Takahashi, Drones and Privacy, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 72 
(2012). 
2018.2_RAVICH_FINAL  
548 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
alleging the company had published a false and 
misleading video showing potential customers a 
device created almost entirely with technology 
from its rivals.186 Similarly, in 2017, a Brooklyn 
federal court ordered a man to spend five years in 
prison and to pay almost $1.5 million in 
restitution for sending out phony public releases 
about a drone company that existed only on 
paper.187 
• Class actions. In February 2017, commercial 
UAV operators sued DJI Technology, Inc. for 
allegedly harmful firmware updates. 188 
Meanwhile, the FAA is itself a defendant in a class 
action lawsuit pending in federal district court in 
Arkansas that seeks refunds from the agency of 
monies UAV owners paid to register their 
drones—a regulatory requirement struck down by 
a federal court as violating the express terms of 
the FMRA.189 
 
186 Ryan Mac, How an Allegedly Fake Video Killed a Much-Hyped 
Drone Startup, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2017, 8:30 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2017/01/13/lawsuit-killed-lily-
robotics-drones/ [perma.cc/CTA2-TF49]. See also Ryan Mac & Aaron Tilley, 
Failed Drone Startup Lily Robotics Raided for Possible Criminal 
Investigation, Sources Say, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2017, 3:39 PM), 
[perma.cc/2XE3-N4HX]. 
187 Kathleen Culliton, Sham Drone Company Head Fined $1.5M in 
Brooklyn Court: Feds, PATCH (Dec. 6, 2017, 3:36 PM), https://patch.com/new-
york/heights-dumbo/sham-drone-company-head-fined-1-5m-brooklyn-
court-feds [perma.cc/BK7D-RXCZ]. 
188 Kathryn Rattigan, DJI Drone Manufacturer Hit with Class Action 




189 See, e.g., Lance Ulanoff, It’s Been 3 Months and the FAA Still Hasn’t 
Refunded My $5 Drone Registration Fee, MASHABLE (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://mashable.com/2017/10/10/faa-drone-registration-refund/ 
[perma.cc/4TNW-VRFC]; Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against the FAA over 
Drone Registry, AERO-NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.aero-
news.net/Subscribe.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=9621c552-d8ce-493a-88d8-
25aa57e6015f [perma.cc/4D4B-5TD3]; see also infra Section IV.D. 
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• Business dealings. Drone racing is rapidly 
gaining popularity. ESPN and Sky Sport 
broadcast events of the Drone Racing League, 
which has raised millions in investment seed 
money. In 2017, however, two Southern California 
tech enthusiasts sued the Drone Racing League, 
Inc. for breach of contract, fraud, and breach of 
fiduciary duty, claiming that they were promised, 
but never received, a one-third ownership interest 
in exchange for providing ideas for the league.190 
• Negligence. A woman sued a University of 
Southern California Pi Kappa Phi fraternity 
chapter when a drone photographing attendees at 
a party fell and allegedly inflicted severe head 
injuries. 191  Several months later, in 
Massachusetts, wedding guests sued the groom 
after a drone he brought to the reception flew and 
crashed into them, allegedly causing permanent 
physical and emotional injury.192 
• Contracts. Some user agreements provided by 
drone manufacturers allow access not only to the 
owner and operator’s tablet or computer used to 
operate a drone, but also to the entire system that 
tablet or computer is connected to, effectively 
 
190 Scott Graham, Drone Racing League Was Our Idea, Tech 
Enthusiasts Say, LAW.COM (Oct. 4, 2017, 10:37 AM), 
https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/10/04/drone-racing-league-was-
our-idea-tech-enthusiasts-say/?slreturn=20171110090122 [perma.cc/ 
W4RW-KECS]. See also Complaint, Laub v. Horbaczewski et al., No. 2:17-




191 See Sama Shah, Party Guest Sues Fraternity over Falling Drone, 
DAILY TROJAN (Sept. 28, 2016), http://dailytrojan.com/2016/09/28/party-
guest-sues-fraternity-falling-drone/ [perma.cc/TG4V-8932]. 
192 Kiera Blessing, Wedding Drone Crash Leads to Guests’ Lawsuit, 
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giving the drone manufacturer access to highly 
proprietary and private imagery and videos.193 
• Product liability. In 2016, Bradley Telling, the 
owner of a DJI Phantom 3 drone, filed a putative 
class action lawsuit against DJI Technology, Inc. 
in Los Angeles Superior Court alleging violations 
of California’s Unfair Competition Law and 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act.194 The company 
refused to give him a refund after his drone went 
out of control and was lost despite DJI’s promotion 
of the device’s “return home” feature.195 
Beyond traditional contract and tort claims, intellectual 
property issues connected to drones are likely to give rise to 
extensive litigation.196  For now, the patent system is 
managing an ever-increasing number of exceptional ideas. For 
example, IBM obtained a patent for technology that makes it 
possible for one drone to hand off packages to another 
drone.197 In 2014, Disney filed several patent applications, 
including one for drones that could carry marionette-version 
characters, “flixels,” that could replace fireworks with lit-up 
substitutes, and drones that could carry around large aerial 
projection screens.198 Relatedly, the halftime show of Super 
 
193 See e.g., Dyan Gibbens, Grounded: How to Integrate Ethics into Your 
Drone Strategy, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 22, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/05/grounded-how-to-integrate-ethics-into-your-drone-
strategy [perma.cc/A56U-5UW3]. 
194 Rick Archer, Drone Didn’t Come Home as Promised, Suit Claims, 
LAW360 (June 28, 2016, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/811782/drone-didn-t-come-home-as-
promised-suit-claims. See Bradley Scott Telling v. DJI Tech. Inc., No. 
BC625051, 2016 WL 3647202 (Cal. Super. June 27, 2016). 
195 See Bradley Scott Telling v. DJI Tech. Inc., 2016 WL 3647202. 
196 See, e.g., SZ DJI Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Yuneec Int’l Co., Ltd., No. 516-
CV-595 BRO (KKx), 2016 WL 8931302 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13 2016) (patent 
dispute regarding a system for controlling UAVs and tracking targets). 
197 See e.g., Brett Williams, IBM Wants Future Delivery Drones to Pass 
Off Your Packages in Mid-air, MASHABLE (Apr. 26, 2017), 
http://mashable.com/2017/04/26/ibm-delivery-drone-patent/ 
[perma.cc/5N49-JDKD]. 
198 See e.g., Jordan Crook, Disney Files Patents to Use Drones in Park 
Shows, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 27, 2014), 
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Bowl LI in February 2017 featured a drone show—a 
synchronized swarm of three hundred of Intel’s illuminated 
“Shooting Star” drones flying over and behind Lady Gaga in 
the formation of an American flag as she recited the Pledge of 
Allegiance from the roof of the stadium.199 Altogether, while 
the diversity of legal claims and theories connected to drones 
is and will be unprecedented, the common law appears well 
built to adapt to and resolve disputes in the information age. 
IV. CRITIQUING THE UAV REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
On June 22, 2017, newly inaugurated President Donald J. 
Trump and Vice President Mike Pence welcomed the CEOs of 
several commercial drone companies to the East Room of the 
White House as part of the American Leadership in Emerging 
Technology event. Organized by the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, the event brought together venture 
capitalists, wireless communication company executives, and 
White House staff to discuss ways in which the administration 
could promote the development and commercialization of 




199 See Ted Greenwald, Intel Basks in Afterglow of Super Bowl Light 
Show Launched by Its Drones, WALL. ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/intel-basks-in-afterglow-of-super-bowl-light-
show-launched-by-its-drones-1486423132 (“Many TV viewers thought they 
were watching a live light show, a perception Intel didn’t go out of its way 
to dispel. ‘Our drones have returned to the ground after an amazing 
#PepsiHalftime show,’ the company tweeted shortly afterward.”); see also 
Henri Gendreau & Alan Levin, Lady Gaga Halftime Drone Swarm Was 
Pretaped to Shield Crowd, BLOOMBERG: PURSUITS (Feb. 7, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-07/lady-gaga-s-halftime-
drone-swarm-was-pretaped-to-shield-crowd [perma.cc/U6NQ-BQT7] (“Intel 
. . . produced a holiday show with Disney in Florida . . . with drones forming 
a green Christmas tree and a blue dove, among other effects.”). 
200 See, e.g., David Shepardson, Trump Meets Wireless, Drone 
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made deregulation a centerpiece of his candidacy and who just 
days after taking office signed an executive order requiring 
federal agencies to eliminate two regulations for every new 
one created,201 the CEO of a drone software and hardware 
company lobbied for something unexpected—more regulation. 
“This is actually the one industry where we actually need 
a little bit more regulation,” PrecisionHawk CEO Michael 
Chasen said, “because the default is actually limiting what 
drone technology can do.”202 He continued, “[w]e need the 
FAA and the other regulatory bodies to have a little bit more 
power to regulate opening up those opportunities so we can 
stay competitive with other countries. It’s one of the few areas 
we’d like to see a little more regulation to actually open up 
opportunity.” 203  An industry overview by Goldman Sachs 
similarly noted, “[t]he rapid growth of the drone industry has 
outpaced the development of rules and systems to govern their 
use. This uncertainty weighs on innovation and commercial 
adoption, but anticipated regulatory clarity should unlock 
demand.”204 
In fact, the FAA codified a national set of commercial drone 
regulations in mid-2016 in the form of Part 107. 205  But, 
getting there was difficult—unnecessarily so, in several 
instances. For example, the FAA failed to act or was slow to 
act despite its authority and Congress’s directive to do so. And 
where the FAA’s authority to act was only arguable, the FAA 
acted definitively and in ways that apparently conflicted with 
 
201 See e.g., Damian Paletta & Michael C. Bender, Trump Signs 
Executive Order to Cut, Restrict Regulations, WALL ST. J. (Jan 30, 2017, 2:44 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-signs-executive-order-to-cut-
restrict-regulations-1485790245; see also Christopher DeMuth, Trump vs. 
the Deep Regulatory State, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2017, 6:10PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-vs-the-deep-regulatory-state-
1510952431. 




204 Drones, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-
thinking/technology-driving-innovation/drones/ [perma.cc/WAQ9-VM4E]. 
205 Small Unmanned Aircraft System, 14 C.F.R. § 107 (2018). 
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its prior practices and policies. In yet other instances, the FAA 
acted on incomplete data. Finally, and perhaps most 
troublesome, the FAA acted where Congress explicitly 
deprived it of authority to act. This Section will explore each 
of these scenarios, primarily to illustrate both the 
corresponding regulatory burdens imposed on emerging UAV 
firms and to draw broader lessons about how precautionary 
principle-based law and policymaking can be flawed as 
applied to the IoT.206 
A. Regulatory Timing 
The FAA took years to arrive at a regulatory framework 
for drones—a reality that alone suppressed innovation. The 
title of a 2014 Fortune article captured the mood of the drone 
business community: “Is the FAA Limiting Drone 
Innovation?”207  
Indeed, according to a lobbyist at the Washington, D.C.-
based drone-advocacy firm Association for Unmanned Vehicle 
Systems International (“AUVSI”), delay by the FAA in 
clearing commercial UAS operations would result in the loss 
of $27 million per day.208 In fact, the current drone economy 
began with investments and activities dating back to 
approximately 2006, but a legal regime dedicated to 
supporting the civil UAV space did not arise until almost six 
years later.  
In 2012, Congress enacted the FMRA, a forward-looking 
law that required the FAA to create a regulatory framework 
to “safely accelerate the integration of civil unmanned aircraft 
systems into the national airspace system . . . not later than” 
 
206 As Professor Cass Sunstein has observed, precautionary principle-
based policymaking presents a test that many of history’s most significant 
innovations would have failed, including airplanes, air conditioning, 
antibiotics, automobiles, chlorine, the measles vaccine, open-heart surgery, 
radio, refrigeration, the smallpox vaccine, and X-rays. Cf. DANIEL 
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 350 (2011). 
207 Mehboob Jeelani, Is the FAA Limiting Drone Innovation?, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/08/28/faa-limiting-drone-
innovation/ [perma.cc/E4TR-7QAD]. 
208 See e.g., id. 
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September 30, 2015.209 Congress also mandated that the FAA 
establish recommendations that define acceptable standards 
for the operation and certification of civil UAVs, ensure that 
any civil UAVs have sense and avoid capability, establish 
standards and requirements for the operator and pilot of a 
civil unmanned aircraft system, and project the best methods 
to enhance the technologies necessary to achieve the safe and 
routine operation of civil UAVs in the NAS.210 The FMRA 
permitted a “phased-in” approach for civil UAV integration, 
but it targeted August 2014 for publication of a final rule 
governing regularized UAV operations.211 The FAA did not 
meet this deadline. 
Rather, in September 2013, various federal authorities 
released a jointly prepared comprehensive plan (the “Plan”) 
that set out several strategic goals for the phased-in 
integration of UAVs into the NAS. 212  It was widely 
anticipated as the green light commercial UAVs had been 
waiting for years to issue. The Plan gave priority to “public” 
UAVs, but forestalled “civil” UAV integration. It speculated 
that civil UAVs would fly without special authorization by 
2015, with “routine” UAV operations by 2020.213 The Plan 
also projected the release of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
for UAVs in early 2014 and an Integration Roadmap laying 
 
209 FAA Modernization & Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, §§ 
332(a)(1), (a)(3), 126 Stat. 11 (2012). Congress has considered amending the 
FMRA to address privacy-related concerns arising from drone operations. 
Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 1262, 113th 
Congress (2013). 
210 FAA Modernization & Reform Act of 2012 § 332(a)(2). 
211 Id. at §§ 332(a)(2)(C), (a)(3). 
212 See JOINT PLANNING AND DEV. OFFICE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS (UAS) COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 3 (2013) (the “Plan”). 
213 Id. at 9. The Plan anticipated that UAV within visual line-of-sight 
would operate in the NAS. In addition to the goals of studying acceptable 
levels of automation for UAS in the NAS and harmonizing UAS operations 
under international UAS protocols, the Plan also addressed important “non-
safety related issues” such as privacy and national security, including cyber 
and communications security. Id. at 7. To that end, the Plan initiated a 
program for the establishment of UAS test ranges to “help inform future 
rulemaking activities and other policy decisions related to safety, privacy, 
and economic growth.” Id. at 15, § 2.4. 
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out a rolling five-year plan for implementing UAV operations 
into the NAS. 214  No Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was 
issued until 2015, 215  though the FAA did release an 
“Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the 
National Airspace (NAS) Roadmap” (the “Roadmap”) on 
November 7, 2013.216 Like policy documents before it, the 
Roadmap was disappointing for its largely aspirational 
nature, forecasting an evolutionary transition from 
“accommodating” UAVs to “integrating” the technology within 
the NAS without also providing a specific timetable for 
implementation of the rules the FMRA mandated.217  
The Roadmap contemplated commercial UAV applications, 
including in the media and entertainment sector,218 but it did 
not go so far as to authorize commercial UAV use generally. 
In fact, it did the opposite. No person was authorized to 
operate a commercial UAV in the NAS without first obtaining 
specific authority and permission from the FAA in several 
ways.219 First, private commercial UAV operators needed to 
obtain a Certificate of Authorization or Waiver (“COA”) from 
the FAA to operate a UAV as a public entity, e.g., agencies 
receiving funding from the federal government, including 
police, fire rescue services, and public universities.220 In this 
 
214 Id. at 4, 17. 
215 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 
80 Fed. Reg. 9544 (proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 
21, 43, 45, 47, 61, 91, 101, 107, 183). See also FAA Releases Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, JONES DAY 
(Mar. 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/FAA-Releases-Notice-of-Proposed-
Rulemaking-for-Small-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-03-04-2015. 
216 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS (UAS) IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE (NAS) 
ROADMAP (2013), http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/uas_roadmap_2013.pdf 
[perma.cc/2XXZ-92M3]. 
217 See id. at 21. 
218 Id. at 7. 
219 See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ORDER NO. 
8130.34D, AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
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manner, a private operator could fly a drone only by 
partnering with a public entity, such as a state university.221 
A COA, as the FAA explains, “is an authorization issued 
by the Air Traffic Organization to a public operator for a 
specific UA activity.”222  Obtaining a COA involves the 
completion of an application process involving  
a comprehensive operational and technical review. If 
necessary, provisions or limitations may be imposed as 
part of the approval to ensure the UA can operate 
safely with other airspace users. In most cases, FAA 
will provide a formal response within 60 days from the 
time a completed application is submitted.223  
Once issued, the COA expires on the stated termination 
date (usually two years) unless surrendered sooner by the 
proponent or revoked by the issuing agency.224 Substantively, 
a COA authorizes an operator to use defined airspace and 
includes special provisions unique to the proposed operation, 
for example, flying only under Visual Flight Rules and/or only 
during daylight hours.225 In any case, the COA pathway is not 
an easy or inexpensive route for civil UAV operators. Only 423 
 
221 Additionally, the COA process produced the unusual result that 
private and public entities flying the same type of drone for the same 
purpose stood on different regulatory footing. For example, a public 
university could itself operate a drone for civil purposes by obtaining a COA, 
but a private university could not fly a drone for civil, non-recreational 
purposes without finding a public sponsor with a COA or otherwise 
establish that somehow it was flying as a public operator. 
222 Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), FED. AVIATION 
ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/service_unit
s/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/ [perma.cc/E4GU-KYQE] (last 
modified Mar. 9, 2018, 1:38 PM). 
223 Id. 
224 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NOTICE NO. JO 
7210.889, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE 
(NAS) ¶ 11(d)(2) (2015), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/ 
Notice/N_JO_7210.889_Unmanned_Aircraft_Operations_in_the_NAS.pdf 
[perma.cc/4PY8-P2GN]. 
225 Certificates of Waiver or Authorization (COA), supra note 222. 
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COAs were issued in 2013,226 demonstrating how relatively 
rare (lawful and/or known) civil UAV operations were.  
Instead of a COA, commercial UAV operators can obtain a 
Special Airworthiness Certificate—Experimental Category 
(“SAC-EC”) under 14 C.F.R. § 21.191 for limited purposes, 
including research and development, market surveying, and 
crew training.227 For all intents and purposes, obtaining a 
special airworthiness certificate is not an effective option for 
civil and commercial UAS operators and owners given 
associated operational limitations and the rarity with which 
the FAA issues such authorizations. Indeed, a SAC-EC 
(appropriately) exacts a high burden of proof on the operators 
of experimental aircraft, requiring them to demonstrate “that 
their unmanned aircraft system can operate safely within an 
assigned flight test area and cause no harm to the public.”228 
Moreover, “[e]xperimental certificate regulations preclude 
carrying people or property for compensation or hire.”229 And, 
applicants bear the substantial burden of describing how their 
system is designed, constructed and manufactured, including 
engineering processes, software development and control, 
configuration management, and quality assurance procedures 
used, along with how and where they intend to fly. 230 
Accordingly, in years past, the best option for civil drone 
operators was somehow to be a public operator or otherwise 
qualify as a public operator (e.g., in partnership with a public 
university or state agency) to obtain a COA from the FAA. 
Section 333 of the FMRA presented an important and 
much-needed intermediate position between the SAC-EC and 
COA process—albeit another route laden with red tape. 
Section 333 mandates that the FAA: (1) identify and 
 
226 See Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), FED. AVIATION 
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determine UAS operations [that] pose the least amount of 
public risk and no threat to national security and could safely 
be operated in the NAS; and based on that assessment, (2) 
establish requirements for the safe operation of the UAS into 
the NAS. Within this framework, the FAA granted thousands 
of “333 exemptions” on a case-by-case basis to qualifying civil 
drone operators. This process was tedious for the regulators 
and the regulated as it required the FAA to evaluate every 
UAS operation individually. As such, in 2015, the FAA 
granted automatic “Blanket COAs” to those exempted from 
Section 333, allowing small drones weighing less than fifty-
five pounds to operate during daytime, within visual flight 
rule conditions, at specific altitudes, and outside of certain 
distances from airports and heliports. The Blanket COA also 
permitted small UAV operators to fly five nautical miles away 
from an airport with an operating control tower, three 
nautical miles from an uncontrolled airport with an 
instrument approach procedure, two nautical miles from all 
other airports, heliports and seaports, and at or below 200 feet 
above ground level. 231 
While functional, the COA and Blanket COA process 
presented a barrier to entry without any corresponding 
empirical benefit in terms of safety or commerce. In fact, the 
Blanket COA merely sanctioned already safety-conscious 
operators to proceed without also deterring or educating 
unscrupulous operators. The result was not only frustration 
in the private sector, but also a disapproving report by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (“DOT”) Inspector 
General who ridiculed the FAA as having “limited knowledge 
of where UAS actually operate and limited means to oversee 
those exempted operators.”232  
 
231 See generally Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Frequently Asked 
Questions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/faqs/ 
[perma.cc/RLZ4-FPRZ] (last modified Feb. 1, 2018, 11:26 AM). 
232 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 
NO. AV-2017-018, FAA LACKS A RISK-BASED OVERSIGHT PROCESS FOR CIVIL 
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The report stated: 
FAA streamlined its process in 2015 for exempting 
civil UAS from regulatory requirements in response to 
increasing requests for exemptions and concerns over 
lengthy approval times. This enabled FAA to increase 
its processing rate, and the rate of exemptions granted 
increased over five-fold in 1 month. However, FAA’s 
process does not verify that operators actually meet or 
understand the conditions and limitations of their 
exemptions either before or after the application is 
approved. Instead, FAA relies solely on information 
provided up front by applicants. As a result, we 
identified instances where exemption holders were 
not in compliance with their approval (e.g., flying a 
UAS without a required pilot’s license) or did not 
understand certain exemption provisions (e.g., 
prohibited night operations). FAA also does not track 
exemption holders beyond the mailing address 
submitted during the application process. As a result, 
FAA has limited knowledge of where UAS actually 
operate and limited means to oversee those exempted 
operators.233  
This was preceded two years earlier by an equally critical 
evaluation by DOT, criticizing the FAA’s work within the 
timetable established by Congress: 
First, following many years of working with industry, 
FAA has not reached consensus on standards for 
technology that would enable UAS to detect and avoid 
other aircraft and ensure reliable data links between 
ground stations and the unmanned aircraft they 
control. Second, FAA has not established a regulatory 
framework for UAS integration, such as aircraft 
certification requirements, standard air traffic 
procedures for safely managing UAS with manned 
aircraft, or an adequate controller training program 
for managing UAS. Third, FAA is not effectively 
collecting and analyzing UAS safety data to identify 
risks. This is because FAA has not developed 
procedures for ensuring that all UAS safety incidents 
 
233 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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are reported and tracked or a process for sharing UAS 
safety data with the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD), the largest user of UAS. Finally, FAA is not 
effectively managing its oversight of UAS operations. 
Although FAA established a UAS Integration Office, 
it has not clarified lines of reporting or established 
clear guidance for UAS regional inspectors on 
authorizing and overseeing UAS operations. Until 
FAA addresses these barriers, UAS integration will 
continue to move at a slow pace, and safety risks will 
remain.  
FAA is making some progress in meeting UAS-related 
provisions of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 
of 2012, but the Agency is significantly behind 
schedule in meeting most of them, including the goal 
of achieving safe integration by September 2015. FAA 
has completed 9 of the act’s 17 UAS provisions, such 
as selecting 6 test sites, publishing a UAS Roadmap, 
and developing a comprehensive plan outlining FAA’s 
UAS plans in the near- and long-term. However, the 
Agency missed the statutory milestones for most of 
these provisions, and much work remains to fully 
implement them. FAA is also behind schedule in 
implementing the remaining eight UAS provisions. 
For example, FAA will not meet the August 2014 
milestone for issuing a final rule on small UAS 
operations. FAA’s delays are due to unresolved 
technological, regulatory, and privacy issues, which 
will prevent FAA from meeting Congress’ September 
30, 2015, deadline for achieving safe UAS integration. 
As a result, while it is certain that FAA will 
accommodate UAS operations at limited locations, it 
is uncertain when and if full integration of UAS into 
the NAS will occur.234  
 
234 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 
NO. AV-2014-061, FAA FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS TO SAFELY INTEGRATE 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 2–3 
(2014), https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/FAA%20Oversight 
%20of%20Unmanned%20Aircraft%20Systems%5E6-26-14.pdf 
[perma.cc/CTC4-XGAX] (footnotes omitted), 
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Alas, in August 2016, the FAA codified Part 107, a new 
mainline regulatory scheme that came into effect for civil (and 
thus commercial) flights of UAVs weighing under fifty-five 
lbs.235 Under Part 107, the person flying a drone must be at 
least sixteen years old and have a remote pilot certificate with 
a small UAS rating, or be directly supervised by someone with 
such a certificate.236 Other key features of the new final rule, 
include the requirement that remote pilots keep their aircraft 
within visual line of sight, aircraft are prohibited from flying 
higher than 400 feet above the ground and cannot operate 
over people, and operations during daylight and during 
twilight are allowed if the drone has anti-collision lights.237 
Industry stakeholders have generally applauded Part 107, 
including a waiver mechanism by which some operational 
strictures can be loosened or avoided in appropriate 
circumstances. For example, pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 107.205 
a certificate of waiver (a “CoW”) may, in approved 
circumstances based on “performance-based standards,” 
grant an operator the right to fly at night, in Class B, C, D, & 
E surface areas, beyond visual line of sight, over people, over 
400 feet above the ground, and near manned aircraft.238 By 
 
235 The COA and “333” framework continues to apply to UAV weighing 
more than fifty-five lbs., though most small UAV operators previously 
issued a COA are migrating to Part 107 operations. Also, according to the 
FAA, pending issuance of separate rules for micro-UAV (those weighing 
under 0.55 lbs.), micro-UAV are governed by Part 107. Small Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, 14 C.F.R. pt. 107 (2018). 
236 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., DOT and FAA Finalize Rules 




238 To obtain a certificate of waiver (a “CoW”) an applicant must submit 
a request containing a complete description of the proposed operation and a 
justification, including supporting data and documentation as necessary, 
that establishes that the proposed operation can safely be conducted under 
the terms of the requested CoW. Operation and Certification of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42064, 42072 (June 28, 2016) (to 
be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, 119, 133, 183). See also 
List of Regulations Subject to Waiver, 14 C.F.R. § 107.205 (2018). For 
example, a request for a major deviation from Part 107 for an operation that 
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November 29, 2017, the FAA had issued 1208 Part 107 
waivers, the highest percentage (70%) of which were for night 
operations, followed by operations over people (29%), BVLOS 
(17%), altitude deviation (9%), and operations from moving 
vehicles (7%).239 Still, the waiver scheme under Part 107 is 
not entirely satisfactory in terms of promoting and supporting 
innovation. The strategy of the head of AT&T’s drone 
program, for example, has been to keep his drones compliant 
with current regulations governing size and mission rather 
than pursuing operations that would require constant 
haggling over waivers.240 
In all, early policy statements, aspirational forecasts 
unaccompanied by rules, and cumbersome (both for regulators 
and the regulated) waiver processes neither reassure careful 
civil UAV users of a path forward nor present risk-taking 
operators with any compelling reason to comply with 
registration or certification processes, the noncompliance of 
which is enforced unsystematically and selectively. Indeed, 
the FAA’s slow approach to UAV integration risked an 
ungovernable situation as the law failed to keep pace with the 
proliferation of UAVs and advances in unmanned aviation.241 
 
takes place in a congested metropolitan area with heavy air traffic will 
likely require significantly more data and analysis than a request for a 
minor deviation for an operation that takes place in a sparsely populated 
area with minimal air traffic. Operation and Certification of Small 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. at 42072. If a CoW is granted, 
that certificate may include additional conditions and limitations designed 
to ensure that the small UAS operation can be conducted safely. Id. 
239 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF COMM., ADMINISTRATOR’S FACT 
BOOK 15 (2017), https://www.faa.gov/news/media/2017_Administrators 
_Fact_Book.pdf [perma.cc/GDA4-MF85]. 
240 Berinato, supra note 9, at 16. See also Todd Bishop, Letter: Amazon 
Running Out of Patience with FAA on Drone Limits, GEEKWIRE (Dec. 9, 2014 
8:52 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2014/letter-amazon-running-patience-
faa-drone-testing-limits/ [perma.cc/W974-WNVX] 
241 Graham Warwick, FAA Under the Gun to Issue SUAS Rule, 
AVIATION WK. NETWORK (Mar. 17, 2014), http://aviationweek.com/awin/faa-
under-gun-issue-suas-rule [perma.cc/K4HZ-FYWZ] (“From filming 
weddings and homes for sale to delivering beers to fisherman and packages 
at doorsteps, the FAA is struggling to stop the burgeoning commercial use 
of UAVs until it can get regulations governing their use in place.”). 
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Fly for Fun 
 
 






No pilot requirements 
 
Must have Remote Pilot 
Airman Certificate 
Must be 16 years old  
Must pass TSA vetting 
Aircraft 
Requirements 
Must be registered if over 0.55 
lbs. 
 
Must be less than 55 lbs.  
Must be registered if over 
0.55 lbs. (online) 
Must undergo pre-flight 
check to ensure UAS is in 
condition for safe operation 
Location 
Requirements 
5 miles from airports without 
prior notificaiton to airport and 
air traffic control 




Must ALWAYS yield right of 
way to manned aircraft 
Must keep the aircraft in sight 
(visual line-of-sight) 
UAS must be under 55 lbs. 
Must follow community-based 
safety guidelines 
Must notify airport and air 
traffic control tower before 
flying within 5 miles of an 
airport 
Must keep the aircraft in 
sight (visual line-of-sight)* 
Must fly under 400 feet* 
Must fly during the day* 
Must fly at or below 100 
mph* 
Must yield right of way to 
manned aircraft* 
Must NOT fly over people* 




Educational or recreational 
flying only 
Flying for commercial use 
(e.g. providing aerial 
surveying or photography 
services) 
Flying incidental to a 
business (e.g. doing roof 





Public Law 112-95, Section 
336—Special Rule for Model 
Aircraft 
FAA Interpretation of the 
Special Rule for Model Aircraft 
Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulation (14 
CFR) Part 107 
 
 
242 FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Getting Started, 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/ [perma.cc/7AT9-YFQV] (last 
modified Dec. 15, 2017, 10:29 AM). 
2018.2_RAVICH_FINAL  
564 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
B. Regulatory Enforcement 
As detailed in Section III.A, supra, in situations in which 
the FAA had authority to act and did act with respect to 
commercial drones, it failed to meet statutory milestones that 
Congress wrote into law. This left the private sector effectively 
grounded and without clear regulatory direction. The pace 
and timeliness of FAA decision-making was a problem. This 
Section presents a different and more substantive problem: 
how the FAA has exerted its authority. That is, where the 
FAA has acted (timely or not), it has exercised its power in 
ways that apparently conflicted with prior agency practice 
and policy and arrested the innovation environment.  
The aftermath of the flight of Raphael “Trappy” Pirker‘s 
unmanned aircraft—a Ritewing Zephyr—on October 17, 2011 
best illustrates the intensity and reasoning of the FAA in 
asserting its authority in the drone space. Pirker flew a model 
airplane in a series of maneuvers around the University of 
Virginia campus in Charlottesville, Virginia, allegedly at 
altitudes ranging from the extremely low level of ten feet 
above ground level up to 1500 feet.243 According to the FAA, 
he operated the airplane “directly towards an individual 
standing on a . . . sidewalk causing the individual to take 
immediate evasive maneuvers so as to avoid being struck by 
[the] aircraft.” 244  Then, he flew “through a . . . tunnel 
containing moving vehicles … under a crane … below tree top 
level over a tree lined walkway . . . under an elevated 
pedestrian walkway … and within approximately 100 feet of 
an active heliport.”245 Consequently, the FAA fined Pirker 
$10,000 under 14 C.F.R. 91.13(a) for operating an “aircraft in 
a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or 
property of another.”246  
 
243 Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629, at 
*2 (Nov. 17, 2014) (final admin. review). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Brief for Appellant at 2, Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-
5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014) (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) 
(2018)). See Kelsey D. Atherton, Judge Strikes Down FAA’s Ban On 
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Pirker challenged the penalty, arguing that the FAA did 
not have legal authority to regulate model aircraft flight 
operations such as his.247 On the other hand, the FAA argued 
that it had the power to regulate all “aircraft,” and that “model 
aircraft” fell within the scope of the term “aircraft.”248 Pirker’s 
glider, the FAA contended, was an “aircraft” and was operated 
for compensation in that payment was received for video and 
photographs taken during the flight. 249  Judge Patrick 
Geraghty of the National Transportation Safety Board 
(“NTSB”), sitting as the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), 
disagreed, reasoning that the FAA had historically considered 
“aircraft” and “model aircraft” as two different aircraft.250 In 
fact, the FAA had modified the term “aircraft” by prefixing the 
word “model” in its policies to distinguish one device or 
contrivance from another. 251  Notwithstanding the FAA’s 
argument that it left unchanged the traditional definition of 
“aircraft” as any “device that is used or intended to be used for 
flight in the air,”252 the ALJ concluded that the FAA’s power 
to regulate “aircraft” did not extend to the regulation of “model 
aircraft.”253 To believe otherwise would be to entertain the 
“risible argument that a flight in the air of, e.g., a paper 
aircraft, or a toy balsa wood glider, could subject the ‘operator’ 
to the regulatory provisions of [the] FAA,” the ALJ wrote.254  
Critically, the ALJ also noticed that the the FAA had not 
formally enacted any rule allowing it to regulate “model” 
 
Commercial Drones, POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/judge-strikes-down-faas-ban-
commercial-drones [perma.cc/HL2H-QY6M]. 
247 Brief for Appellant at 3, Raphael. Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-
5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
248 Decisional Order at 3, Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, 
2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
249 Decisional Order Attachment 1 at 1, Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order 
No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
250 Decisional Order at 8, Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, 
2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
251 Id. at 3. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 4. 
254 Id. at 3. 
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aircraft as “aircraft,” and so it could not apply long-standing 
laws applicable to aircraft to Pirker’s model airplane for 
enforcement or litigation purposes. That is,  
[The FAA] has not issued an enforceable [Federal 
Aviation Regulation (“FAR”)] regulatory rule 
governing model aircraft operation; has historically 
exempted model aircraft from the statutory FAR 
definitions of ‘aircraft’ by relegating model aircraft 
operations to voluntary compliance with [existing 
FAA guidance] . . . . [Thus, Pirker’s] model aircraft was 
not subject to FAR regulation and enforcement.255 
The ALJ also highlighted the fact that the FAA did not 
follow the proper rulemaking procedures for enacting valid 
UAV regulations.256 While it had published various notices 
and policy statements with respect to UAVs, it had done so for 
internal purposes and not for purposes applicable to the 
general public.257 To create a valid rule for UAV operation the 
FAA should have published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
without which “there was no enforceable FAA rule or FAR 
Regulation applicable to model aircraft or for classifying 
model aircraft as an UAS.”258 
Approximately one month after the ALJ’s order, the FAA 
appealed to the full NTSB,259 announcing in a press release 
that the appeal was necessary because “this decision could 
impact the safe operation of the national airspace and the 
safety of people and property on the ground.”260 The FAA 
attacked the “ALJ’s reasoning for finding that a Ritewing 
Zepher power glider is not an aircraft under the statutory and 
 
255 Id. at 4. 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 5 (citing Syncor Int’l Corp., 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1995)) 
(explaining that an administrative body’s policy guidance cannot be binding 
unless it has been released to the general public for comment). 
258 Id. 
259 See Brief for Appellant at 1, Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-
5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
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regulatory definitions of the word ‘aircraft’ [as] both illogical 
and deeply flawed.” 261  The FAA also emphasized its 
extraordinary concurrent roles of author, interpreter, and 
enforcer of its own rules, noting that the “FAA stands in a 
better place than [the ALJ] to know both what the statutory 
and regulatory definitions of the word ‘aircraft’ mean and the 
parameters of its authority to enforce its own regulations.”262 
The FAA ultimately won the case as the NTSB ruled that 
Pirker’s UAV fell within the plain language of aircraft under 
49 U.S.C. § 40102(6): “any contrivance invented, used, or 
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.” 263  Moreover, the 
NTSB ruled, “the statutory and regulatory definitions, as well 
as Advisory Circular 91-57, and FAA Notice 07-01, contain no 
express exclusion for unmanned or model aircraft.”264 
Since Pirker, the FAA has reported issuing slightly less 
than two dozen civil penalties to drone operators, with fines 
generally ranging between $400 and $5500 (with one outlier 
at $1.9 million). Enforcement has concentrated in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Boston265—though no one seems to 
have been fined for flying a drone commercially.266 The FAA 
 
261 Brief for Appellant at 5, Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-
5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 17, 2014). 
262 Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (explaining that an agency is entitled to substantial 
deference in interpreting its own rules)). 
263 Raphael Pirker, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 
(Nov. 17, 2014). See John Goglia, NTSB Overturns Pirker Case: Finds for 
FAA that Drones are Aircraft Subject to Its Rules, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2014, 
9:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoglia/2014/11/18/ntsb-
overturns-pirker-finds-for-faa-that-drones-are-aircraft-subject-to-its-rules/ 
(“Mr. Pirker can appeal this case to the Court of Appeals. Since there is no 
chance of FAA drone rules being published in the near future, it is now up 
to Congress to determine whether it wants every model aircraft regardless 
of size to be regulated by the FAA’s rules for manned aircraft.”). 
264 Pirker, 2014 WL 8095629, at *7. 
265 Jason Koebler, The FAA Gave Us a List of Every Drone Pilot Who 
Has Ever Been Fined, MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2016, 2:20 PM), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/faa-drone-fines. 
266 Jason Koebler, The FAA Has Never Fined Anyone For Flying a 
Drone Commercially, MOTHERBOARD (June 1, 2016, 2:30 PM), 
2018.2_RAVICH_FINAL  
568 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2018 
has predicated these fines on the very same catch-all 
regulation—14 C.F.R. § 91.13—applied in Pirker, which 
prohibits flying in a “careless or reckless manner.” Highlights 
of FAA UAV enforcement follow: 
• September 30, 2013. David Zablidowski was fined 
$2,200 (settled for $400) for flying in Manhattan, 
landing on the ground 20 feet from a person. (This 
was the first hobbyist ever fined for flying a 
drone.) 
• July 7, 2014. Wilkens Mendoza was fined $1,100 
and arrested by the New York Policy Department 
for flying a drone near the George Washington 
Bridge. (The fine was later withdrawn.) 
• January 26, 2015. Shawn Usman, a government 
employee, was fined $5,500 for crashing his drone 
into a tree on the White House lawn. 
• May 14, 2015. Ryan MacDonald was fined $4,400 
after flying a drone in Lafayette Park near the 
White House. The FAA claimed that the secret 
service “cleared the entire north side of the White 
House of people … due to your operation of the 
aircraft.” 
• May 16, 2015. Xizmo Media Productions was fined 
$18,700 (settled for $5,500, in monthly 
installments of $222.22 until June 2017) for flying 
an unregistered drone recklessly in connection 
with shooting footage of Fordham University’s 
2015 commencement ceremony. 
• July 5, 2015. Jorge Lubo was fined $1,100 in 
connection with flight of his Parrot Bebop, which 
crashed into a United States Coast Guard vehicle. 
• September 17, 2015. Adam Rupeka was fined 
$1,100 for crashing his drone into the New York 
State Capitol building. 
• September 3, 2015. Daniel Verley was fined $2,200 
(settled for $1,320) for flying a drone above the 
U.S. Open, crashing 70 feet from the tennis court. 
• October 2015. Chicago-based SkyPan was fined 
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in connection with repeated drone flights near 
high rises in restricted airspace around the 
nation. The matter was settled for $200,000. 
The chief takeaway of the Pirker decision may not be the 
final decision reached, but how the FAA failed in many ways 
to serve their constituents. In particular, stakeholders in 
emerging commercial sectors are not well-served when 
regulators—even if ultimately successful—express their 
positions as defendants in administrative proceedings rather 
than through formal, proper (and, in the FAA’s case, 
congressionally-mandated) rulemaking. Indeed, the FAA’s 
appeal in Pirker itself created uncertainty. On the one hand, 
the ALJ had confirmed that the FAA had not enacted any 
UAV-specific regulations—a situation that seemingly should 
have allowed UAV operators to proceed until a definite set of 
regulations were enacted. (The ALJ’s decision was stayed 
pending the FAA’s appeal.) On the other hand, the FAA had 
produced guidance that put the UAV community on notice of 
its authority to permit or restrict flight of arguably. This left 
UAV operators to decide for themselves how to proceed—fly 
with the expectation that the ALJ’s decision would be 
affirmed, or stay on the ground while other commercial 
operators brushed aside the FAA’s appeal and gained market 
share.267 This situation endured for almost a quarter of 2014. 
And, while the FAA perhaps vindicated its position as the 
dominant authority on all aircraft-related issues, it did so at 
the expense of effectuating the FMRA’s directive that the FAA 
create and implement rules integrating UAVs into the 
NAS.268  
 
267 The FAA is blameless for this circumstance in part because 
uncertainty is expected when a lower court rules adversely to any agency 
interpretation. But, what was surprising about Pirker was the verve with 
which the FAA litigated and asserted its power to regulate commercial 
drones in light of its failure to formalize any rules or guidance that did 
anything more than disallow any ground operators. 
268 See, e.g., Mike Masnick, FAA Settles Key Case Over Commercial 
Drone Use . . . Leaves the Rest of Us with No Rules At All, TECHDIRT (Jan. 
23, 2015, 1:37 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150122/ 
17333929785/faa-settles-key-case-over-commercial-drone-use-leaves-rest-
us-with-no-rules-all.shtml [perma.cc/TBU4-FM7A] (reporting that Mr. 
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C. Regulatory Decisions with Incomplete Data 
In addition to the foregoing criticisms of the FAA—that the 
agency used its limited resources to reverse engineer existing 
aviation rules to fit the circumstances in Pirker for 
enforcement purposes rather than to timely enact new UAV 
rules—the information on which the FAA has effected its 
decisions respecting UAVs has also drawn disapproval.  
In fairness, with the FAA projecting 7 million drones in the 
national airspace by 2020,269 incorporating unmanned aerial 
operations into an ecosystem originally designed for manned 
flight is not an easy job. Complicating matters is the fact that 
FAA resources are as limited as any other federal agency, if 
not more so. The FAA had no employees or offices dedicated 
to the issue of UAVs until only recently, with the formation of 
its Unmanned Aircraft Program Office occurring in 2016. And, 
the Air Traffic Organization (“ATO”), the operational arm of 
the FAA, is already responsible for providing safe and efficient 
air navigation services to 29.4 million square miles of 
airspace—representing more than 17% of the world’s 
airspace. 270  Adding autonomous and optionally-piloted 
remote-control airplanes into this mix presents a formidable 
regulatory ask. A general aviation airport manager made the 
point by expressing confusion why the FAA restricted him 
from refusing to allow a UAV operator to fly in critical spaces 
near his airport when the FAA itself was ill-equipped to deter 
and punish dangerous behavior:  
I have no right to decline UAS operations at the 
approach-end of a runway. I have to give way. When 
the [drone operator is] bad, I advise [the FAA’s] flight 
 
Pirker agreed to pay $1100 to the FAA, without an admission of wrongdoing, 
in full and final settlement of the enforcement action against him). 
269 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Releases 2016 to 2036 
Aerospace Forecast, https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=85227 
&cid=TW414 [perma.cc/D532-FNDB] (last modified Mar. 24, 2016, 12:!0 
PM). 
270 Air Traffic Organization, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/ 
[perma.cc/RC6F-76JL] (last modified Dec. 5, 2017, 10:25 AM). 
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standards [personnel]. Which is an idle threat because 
they only have 3 people there who have responsibility 
for an area the size of West Virginia and some users 
are very well aware of it.271  
Unsurprisingly, the FAA has approached civil UAVs with 
precautionary principle-based thinking, i.e., “the belief that 
new innovations should be curtailed until their developers can 
prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, 
groups, specific entities, or various existing laws, norms, or 
traditions.” 272  However, the actual number of potential 
conflicts between manned and unmanned airplanes near 
airports is wanting, though anecdotal evidence is not hard to 
find worldwide.273 For example, in March 2015, the United 
Arab Emirates Department of Economic Development banned 
the use and sale of recreational drones after one flew too close 
to critical flight paths and forced the suspension of all flights 
at Dubai International Airport.274 In 2016, Dubai’s airport—
the third busiest in the world—was forced to shut down three 
separate times because of unauthorized drone activity, with 
the most recent shutdown requiring the diversion of flights 
and the closing of the airport for ninety minutes at a cost of 
$1 million a minute.275 Dubai’s experience is not isolated: 
Polish aviation authorities took steps to revise their drone 
regulations after a drone nearly collided with a commercial 
jetliner at Warsaw Chopin Airport.276 In the United States, 
 
271 UAS and Airports: Survey, RAVICH LAW FIRM, PLLC (2016–2017) (on 
file with author). 
272 Thierer, supra note 20, at 39. 
273 See, e.g., Gareth Corfield, supra note 19 (“Although the near-miss 
was reported to police, a search of the area revealed no trace of the drone or 
its operator.”). 
274 Anwar Ahmad, Sale of Drones Banned in Abu Dhabi, NATIONAL 
(Mar. 11, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sale-of-
recreational-drones-banned-in-abu-dhabi [perma.cc/B3AX-7E56]. 
275 Zahraa Alkhalisi, Dubai Deploys a ‘Drone Hunter’ to Keep Its Airport 
Open, CNN: TECH (Nov. 4, 2016, 6:24 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/04/technology/dubai-airport-drone-hunter/ 
[perma.cc/AB39-E7F2]. 
276 Safe Sky—Regulations of Drones in Poland, URZAD LOTNICTWA 
CYWILNEGO (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.ulc.gov.pl/en/270-english/current-
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meanwhile, vendors Brookstone and Hudson News removed 
UASs from their airport store shelves after New York and 
New Jersey transportation authorities demanded that they 
stop offering the merchandise for sale.277 And, most recently, 
on November 28, 2017, a research team from the Alliance for 
System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence 
(“ASSURE”) released a report detailing how drones colliding 
with large manned aircraft could cause more structural 
damage than birds of the same weight for a given impact 
speed—a finding that will assist the FAA in developing 
operational and collision risk mitigation requirements for 
drones.278 
In this context, the FAA’s initial reaction to the drone 
economy—a ban on all civil (e.g., non-government) and 
commercial operations—reflected a policy decision that the 
seriousness of an accident or incident involving a drone 
outweighed even the small probability of such an event 
occurring.279 This reasoning was no doubt informed by reports 
about drones conflicting and nearly colliding with passenger 
jets and other aviation traffic around airports. In fact, in 2015, 
the FAA released a report of 650 “possible encounters with 
unmanned aircraft” between November 2014 and August 
2015—with drone “sightings” estimated as high as 100 a 




277 Airport Stores Agree to Stop Selling Drones After Plea from Port 
Authority, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 20, 2015), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3050155/fast-feed/airport-stores-agree-to-
stop-selling-drones-after-plea-from-port-authority [perma.cc/S3Z5-4TTK]. 
278 Researchers Release Report on Drone Airborne Collisions, FED. 
AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=89246 
[perma.cc/HXK8-8GXM] (last modified Nov. 28, 2017, 12:52 PM). 
279 Manufacturers and safety-conscious drone operators themselves 
believe that just one tragedy involving a reckless or careless drone operator 
and a commercial jet would undo the progress made by responsible drone 
builders and users and doom the development of any and all civil and 
commercial drone industry from a regulatory perspective. See, e.g., UAS 
Issues and Integration Conference, AM. ASS’N AIRPORT EXECUTIVES, 
https://www.aaae.org/AAAE/AAAEMemberResponsive/Events/2016/11/161
107/CCO_Master.aspx (comments of various panelists and attendees). 
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But, industry observers have challenged as incomplete the 
data underlying the ban the FAA imposed on civil drones. 
Reported drone encounters occurred above 3,000 feet—well 
above the 500-foot ceiling established for commercial UAS and 
400 feet recommended for model aircraft. This reality 
prompted an Aviation Week and Space Technology editorial 
to assert that, “[t]he FAA did itself no favors by releasing a 
list of 650 ‘possible encounters with unmanned aircraft’ 
reported between November 2014 and August 2015. This 
mixes pilot sightings close to airports, where the threat is 
highest, with passing encounters and reports from air traffic 
controllers and the public. It is good for grabbing headlines, 
but not for defining dangers.”280 
This criticism has persisted. The Inspector General of DOT 
wrote a 2016 audit that was critical of the FAA for failing to 
address the risk of drones in a concerted way: 
While FAA has taken some steps to advance UAS 
technology, the Agency has not established a risk-
based safety oversight process for civil UAS 
operations—a key tool for focusing resources on a 
range of emerging risks. Moreover, FAA safety 
inspectors have received only limited UAS-related 
training and guidance. For example, as of April 2016, 
there were no formal, instructor-led training courses 
and only two outdated online courses available to 
inspectors focused on UAS technology.  
In addition, FAA field offices, which are responsible 
for oversight, do not receive sufficient information 
regarding UAS operators—such as where or when 
most UAS will be operating in their jurisdiction—from 
Agency Headquarters, hindering their ability to 
provide proactive oversight. At the same time, reports 
of UAS sightings to FAA primarily from pilots have 
risen to over 100 per month. Despite this increase in 
 
280 Better Data Needed on Risks Small UAS Pose to Air Traffic, 177 
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. 1 (2015); see also Craig Whitlock, FAA Records 
Detail Hundreds of Close Calls Between Airplanes and Drones, WASH. POST 
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reported UAS events, FAA’s enforcement actions for 
operators who violate UAS requirements have been 
limited, in part because FAA thus far has prioritized 
operator education over enforcement. In the absence 
of a risk-based oversight system, FAA inspectors 
respond primarily to incidents only after they are 
reported. FAA also lacks a robust data reporting and 
tracking system for UAS activity, and the information 
available is difficult to analyze and collected in a 
fragmented manner throughout the Agency.  
For example, one FAA office received reports 
indicating that an approved UAS operator was flying 
regularly at night—outside of exemption limitations—
but due to a lack of routine analysis, this office did not 
provide the information to the field for further 
investigation until an FAA inspector requested it 4 
months later in response to a complaint. As a result, 
FAA is currently restricted to a reactive approach to 
UAS oversight, rather than proactively identifying 
and mitigating risks with a rapidly advancing 
technology.281 
In fact, the FAA is struggling to keep up with the risk that 
recreational drones pose. Recently, near and around airports, 
reports of safety incidents involving civilian drones surged to 
an average of 250 a month by October 2017, leading to a 
federal “emergency.” In fact, in September, 2017, the NTSB 
confirmed a midair collision involving a drone and a manned 
military aircraft, a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter that was 
patrolling New York Harbor during the United Nations 
General Assembly.282 Taking these events together, the FAA 
 
281 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 232, at 2–3. 
282 See, e.g., Jim Moore, Drone Pilot Provides Data from Black Hack 
Midair, AOPA (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-
news/2017/october/05/drone-pilot-provides-data-from-black-hawk-midair 
[perma.cc/PFX4-QKBS]; Jim Moore, FAA Seeks ‘Emergency’ Action on 
Drones, AOPA (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-
news/2017/october/16/faa-seeks-emergency-action-on-drones 
[perma.cc/PZ3M-ZVNU] (“The helicopter landed safely despite main rotor 
damage, and a piece of the drone was recovered from inside the helicopter 
that led investigators to the operator with help from drone maker DJI. The 
area where the Sept. 21 collision took place does not appear to be within an 
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published a notice in the Federal Register on October 11, 
2017, to request authority on an emergency basis from the 
White House Office of Management and Budget to put 
electronic authorization of drone flights in controlled airspace 
on a fast track.283 The agency’s 90-day processing time for 
approvals has led to a sharp increase of “non-compliant” 
operations: 
Since the promulgation of part 107, the FAA has 
received an extremely high volume of airspace 
authorization requests for UAS operations. From 
September 2016 to July 2017 the Agency received 
20,566 authorization requests. Of these, the Agency 
has processed 14,334 and continues to have over 6,000 
authorizations in the processing queue. Requests have 
steadily increased over time, and the FAA expects the 
queue will exceed 25,000 pending authorizations 
within the next 6 months. The volume of these 
authorization requests has dramatically increased the 
time between submission and approval of those 
authorization requests. Currently, airspace 
authorization requests may be in queue sixty to ninety 
days before receiving a response. The time necessary 
to process these requests has resulted in an increase 
in safety reports due to noncompliant operations. 
Today there are an average of 250 safety reports a 
month, or approximately 1,500 over a six-month 
period, associated with a potential risk of an incident 
between manned aircraft and a UAS.284 
The FAA had expected to take until the end of the year to 
automate airspace authorization requests through the Low 
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability 
(“LAANC”) system, but “the pressing safety consideration of 
 
area where a drone flight could have been authorized, given the tightly 
controlled New York Class B airspace and the presence of flight restrictions 
to protect the U.N. General Assembly. The U.S. Army, NTSB, and FAA are 
all investigating, and no sanctions have been announced against the pilot, 
who is cooperating with the investigation, NTSB officials said.”). 
283 See FAA Seeks ‘Emergency’ Action on Drones, supra note 282. 
284 Request for Emergency Processing of Collection of Information by 
the Office of Management and Budget, 82 Fed. Reg. 47289 (Oct. 11, 2017).  
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reducing safety reports due to non-compliant UAS operations 
[apparently means] the FAA cannot wait the normal 90 days 
of public comment,” the agency FAA advised.285 In the final 
analysis, the FAA’s approach to drone safety has had a certain 
ad hoc quality to it that is difficult to reconcile with the time 
it has had to plan and budget for foreseeable risks. 
D. Regulatory Overreach: Chevron Deference 
To this point, FAA UAV policy has been criticized for its 
timeliness, its apparent conflict with prior agency practice, 
and at times its lack of a complete evidentiary basis. More 
concerning than these items—and perhaps most concerning 
generally—is the agency’s regulatory overreach. For example, 
a federal appeals court in Washington, D.C. recently struck 
down a rule requiring recreational drone users to register 
their devices with the FAA.286 
The FAA rolled out its registration requirement in late 
2015 as a safety measure designed to protect the skies from 
irresponsible and uninformed flyers of small drones. The new 
regulatory regime required both commercial and recreational 
drone operators to provide contact information, pay a $5 
registration fee, and obtain a unique FAA-issued identifier 
number to affix to drone before flying.287 Failure to register 
carried civil and criminal penalties, including up to three 
years’ imprisonment.288 
 
285 Id. The FAA characterized the Low Altitude Authorization and 
Notification Capability system as “vital to the safety of the National 
Airspace System because it would (1) encourage compliance with 14 CFR 
107.41 by speeding up the time to process authorization requests (2) reduce 
distraction of controllers working in the Tower, and (3) increase public 
access and capacity of the system to grant authorizations.” Id. The FAA 
further estimated that at least a thirty percent reduction in noncompliant 
operations would result in 450 fewer safety reports over the next six 
months. Id. 
286 See Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
287 Aircraft Registry—Aircraft Registration: Unmanned Aircraft (UA), 
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/licenses_certificates/aircraft_ 
certification/aircraft_registry/UA/ [perma.cc/6N8M-CC9K] (last modified 
Mar. 8, 2018, 5:47 PM). 
288 Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092. 
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While close to 800,000 drone operators registered, airplane 
hobbyists have objected to the Registration Rule since its 
inception.289 The rule, after all, was borne out of a rushed 
attempt to manage the anticipated sale of millions of new 
drones weighing about half a pound or more during the 
holiday season. In November 2015, the FAA convened an 
industry working group to make formal recommendations 
about which “aircraft should be exempt from registration due 
to a low safety risk, including toys and certain other small 
[drones].” 290  Members of the registration task force had a 
mere 30 days to develop the regulatory platform, which the 
FAA proceeded to formalize in a final Registration Rule in 
December 2015 on an emergency basis.291 
The FAA never explained why or how a mandatory 
registration rule extended to hobby drones flown in backyards 
below the national airspace (approximately 500 feet) 
enhanced public safety. Although the FAA released a list of 
650 “possible encounters with unmanned aircraft” between 
November 2014 and August 2015, the agency provided no data 
to differentiate the real danger of small drones flying near 
airports from passing encounters and reports from the public. 
What is more, the FAA never explained how a registration 
requirement for model aircraft would accomplish (or has since 
accomplished) the overarching objective of identifying, 
deterring, and taking enforcement action against 
unscrupulous and anonymous drone operators who have no 
incentive to voluntarily comply with the law. 
But the most significant objection to the Registration Rule 
was the legality of the rule itself as applied to hobby drones. 
That was the key issue in Taylor v. Huerta, a case brought by 
 
289 Tony Romm, Turns Out, You’re Going to Have to Register Your 
Small Drones with the U.S. Government After All, RECODE (Dec. 12, 2017, 
10:13 AM), https://www.recode.net/2017/12/12/16766554/us-congress-
trump-drone-registration-faa [perma.cc/88MA-ZYKE]. 
290 David Esler, And Now a Few Words from Your FAA, AVIATION WK. 
NETWORK (Dec. 28, 2015), http://aviationweek.com/bca/and-now-few-words-
your-faa [perma.cc/U2CW-YRYZ]. 
291 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Announces Small UAS 
Registration Rule (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/news/ 
press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=19856 [perma.cc/65TB-6RLF]. 
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a Maryland lawyer who argued that the FAA had no authority 
to create the Registration Rule and compel him to register his 
hobby airplane.292 His argument was based on a law Congress 
enacted in 2012, the FAA Modernization and Reform Act (the 
“FMRA”), which explicitly prohibits the FAA from creating 
“any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft.”293 
Despite the FMRA’s clear language, the FAA insisted that 
its Registration Rule was not a new rule or one that conflicted 
with the Act, but instead was a continuation of a 1920s-era 
rule requiring the registration of manned aircraft. Therefore, 
the FAA argued, the Registration Rule was as an exercise of 
its discretion of a pre-existing authority to “build a culture of 
accountability and responsibility.”294 However, the FAA had 
never interpreted its registration requirement to apply to the 
model aircraft community, which has operated in accordance 
with a community-based set of safety guidelines under the 
auspices of a nationwide organization, the Academy of Model 
Aeronautics since 1936. 
The FAA’s arguments might have found support under a 
1984 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., by which 
courts defer to agency expertise, judgment, and 
interpretation. 295  But, perhaps mindful of Justice Neil 
Gorsuch’s description of Chevron as “a judge-made doctrine 
for the abdication of the judicial duty,” the three-judge panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Taylor did 
not defer to the FAA as the judge, jury, and enforcer of its own 
rules.296 Instead, the court did what the Constitution qualifies 
 
292 See generally Taylor, 856 F.3d. 1089. 
293 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-95, § 
336(a), 126 Stat. 11 (2012). 
294 Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092. See Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., 
U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx Announces Unmanned 
Aircraft Registration Requirement (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/news_story.cfm?newsId=19594 
[perma.cc/725J-D76Q]. 
295 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
296 Jonathan H. Adler, Should Chevron be Reconsidered? A Federal 
Judge Thinks So., WASH. POST. (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/24/ 
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only courts to do: to say what the law is, and to interpret the 
text and structure of a statue enacted by Congress. 
As Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote in the Taylor 
court’s unanimous opinion, deciding the case was easy: 
“Statutory interpretation does not get much simpler.”297 The 
Registration Rule was unlawful as applied to model aircraft, 
the court noted, because it was an attempt by an 
administrative agency to make a new rule despite Congress’ 
express prohibition against the promulgation of a “rule or 
regulation regarding a model aircraft.”298 The court was blunt 
in addressing the FAA’s strained position, stating at oral 
argument: “You’re just making stuff up; that’s not what the 
statute says.”299 
In reaching its decision, the Taylor court not only confined 
regulators to their explicit legal authority, but it also declined 
the Chevron invitation to substitute its own judgment for that 
of Congress. In fact, the court noted that “Congress is of course 
always free to repeal or amend its 2012 prohibition on FAA 
rules regarding model aircraft. Perhaps Congress should do 
so. Perhaps not.”300 That is, it is not for the court to say, but 
neither is it for the FAA. 
The Taylor case provides an important example of how well 
(or not) the law adapts to technological innovations in the 
drone age. And, in a broader context, by carefully navigating 
between the Scylla and Charybdis of judicial deference and 
overreach, the Taylor court demonstrated how traditional 
eighteenth century constitutional doctrines of separation of 
powers and judicial restraint remain relevant for reigning in 




297 Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1092. 
298 Id. 
299 Oral Argument, Taylor v. Huerta, 856 F.3d 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2017.nsf/469F0B57ED
A3C53A852580E300577ED7/$file/15-1495.mp3. 
300 Taylor, 856 F.3d at 1093. 
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when the drone registration rule was actually reinstated as 
part of the National Defense Authorization Act.301 
V. CONCLUSION 
Drones epitomize the IoT with their “smart” properties and 
untold-number of applications in the leisure, prosumer, and 
commercial markets, operating at the convergence of novel 
legal, business, and technological issues. Commercial drones, 
in particular, offer profound economic benefits. But these 
“benefits may not come about if preemptive, precautionary 
policy interventions limit new innovation opportunities.”302  
This Article has shown defects in ex-ante policymaking in 
the specific context of UAVs. It has detailed four examples of 
how regulators have impeded the adoption of commercial 
drones through precautionary principle-based policymaking 
based on ephemeral fears and stringent prophylactic 
restrictions, including untimely rulemaking masquerading as 
deliberation and caution; aggressive enforcement arguably at 
odds with historic policy guidance; regulatory decisions made 
with incomplete data; and overreach. While the FAA has 
ultimately codified an initial set of uniform, national 
commercial UAV rules that broadly provide a pathway for 
some commercial UAV operations, it has left some of the 
potentially most profitable types of operations (e.g., night 
operations, beyond visual line of sight, operations over people) 
to a case-by-case waiver process. This waiver process may be 
unnecessarily paternalistic of firms that are self-incentivized 
and self-motivated to fly competently and safely. Indeed, a 
system of waivers, “in itself creates the prospect of writing 
 
301 See e.g., Brian Heater, Trump Signs Bill Reinstating the FAA’s 
Drone Registration Requirement, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/12/trump-signs-bill-reinstating-the-faas-
drone-registration-requirement/ [perma.cc/S9TL-9YFK] (“The reinstated 
rules were one small piece of the $700 billion National Defense 
Authorization Act, about which the president reportedly said, ‘We need our 
military, it’s gotta be perfecto.’ Likely the bit about drone registration didn’t 
even register a blip on the president’s radar.”). 
302 Thierer, supra note 20, at 117. 
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policy through a series of exemptions, which would reflect a 
certain ad hocness rather than purposeful design.”303 
To be fair, regulators are drinking from a firehose, as 
eighteenth-century common law conceptions of privacy and 
private property rights do not fit neatly into the information 
age and could not have anticipated a projected 7 million 
drones by 2020. Moreover, not to be lost in the discussion of 
drones as data devices is the actual safety risk that 
autonomous, automated, and optionally-piloted small 
airplanes pose to people and property at low altitudes and in 
the national airspace system originally designed for manned 
assets. As one Economist article synthesized: 
Moving bits around the internet is one thing; moving 
atoms around in the real world is something else 
entirely. In the two decades of the internet era, many 
world-changing technologies—web-publishing, file-
sharing, online auctions, internet telephony, virtual 
currencies, ride-hailing—have raised new legal and 
regulatory questions. In each case, regulators had to 
work out the rules after the event: figuring out how 
libel law applies to the web, banning the sale of Nazi 
memorabilia, deciding whether Bitcoin is a currency, 
determining whether Uber drivers are employees or 
contractors, and so on. But drones are a different 
matter, because of the danger that flying robots pose 
to life and limb, and the existence of strict rules that 
govern the use of physical airspace. Their future will 
depend as much on decisions made by regulators as it 
does on technological advances. How will it play 
out?304  
 
303 KREPS, supra note 58, at 3. 
304 The Future of Drones Depends on Regulation, Not Just Technology, 
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Historically, the answer—from bicycles 305  to cars 306  to 
airplanes307—has been that regulators outlaw or impede the 
ownership and/or use of disruptive technologies until the 
safety of the innovation is established and/or society accepts 
the risks attendant to a particular innovation, trading off its 
drawbacks with its benefits. That has been, and likely is, the 
regulatory trajectory for commercial drone firms. 
But given the pace of the sharing and gig economy, 
defection is a tangible consequence of the type of inefficient ex 
ante (preemptive and precautionary) regulation that has 
weighed down the commercial UAV segment for almost a 
 
305 See, e.g., State v. Yopp, 97 N.C. 477 (1887). A bicyclist was charged 
with unlawfully riding a bicycle without state permission. The law required 
bicyclists to obtain permission from the superintendent of a road because 
“the use of the bicycle on the road materially interfered with the exercise of 
the rights and safety of others in the lawful use of their carriages and horses 
in passing over the road.” Id. at 481. In upholding the exercise of this state 
police power, the North Carolina Supreme Court subordinated the right of 
Yopp to use his bicycle to the peril it presented other people and traffic. Id. 
306 See, e.g., Lewis v. Amorous, 59 S.E. 338, 340 (Ga. App. 1907). 
Litigation centered on whether “automobiles [should be] classed with 
ferocious animals, and that the law relating to the duty of the owners of 
such animals is to be applied.” Id. The court—many of whose judges had 
never owned a car—noted that the technology was neither good nor bad 
without context: 
It is not the ferocity of automobiles that is to be feared, but 
the ferocity of those who drive them. Until human agency 
intervenes, they are usually harmless. While by reason of 
the rate of pay allotted to judges in this state few, if any, of 
them have ever owned one of these machines, yet some of 
them have occasionally ridden in them, thereby acquiring 
some knowledge of them; and we have, therefore, found out 
that there are times when these machines, not only lack 
ferocity, but assume such an indisposition to go that it taxes 
the limits of human ingenuity to make them move at all. 
[Automobiles] are not to be classed with bad dogs, vicious 
bulls, evil disposed mules, and the like. 
Id. 
307 Early courts characterized aviation an ultra-hazardous activity to 
which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. See generally, e.g., Northwest 
Airlines, Inc. v. Rowe, 226 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1955). 
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decade.308 In 2013, for example, USA Today reported about an 
underground drone economy taking flight in the absence of 
regulations in the United States.309 In 2014, DHL, unable to 
get authorization to test its drone (carrying medicine) in the 
United States, simply arranged to fly in Germany instead.310 
Amazon did the same in Canada, as did Google in 
Australia. 311  Private-public partnerships, meanwhile, are 
favored arrangements for stakeholders and regulators to 
address regulatory concerns tied to emerging technologies 
collaboratively, but consensus and agreement is elusive.312 
Worse, the federal government’s farming out the difficult task 
of establishing drone regulations to private companies may be 
leaving startups and smaller “[c]ompanies that ultimately 
don’t join any of the FAA’s drone-related committees [to] fear 
that the agency is playing kingmaker in allowing certain 
companies advance control of the airspace.”313 Finally, and 
most recently, reports in 2017 that a federal drone advisory 
 
308 This is occurring in the context of self-driving cars as Uber 
Technologies “defiantly offered rides to San Francisco customers in a 
handful of autonomous vehicles despite opposition from California 
regulators who demand the company get a state permit [under decades-old 
taxi laws] or pull the autos off the road.” Greg Bensinger & Tim Higgins, 
Uber’s Clash with Regulators Moves to Self-Driving Cars, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 
18, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-clash-with-
regulators-moves-to-self-driving-cars-1482090589. 
309 See Alistair Barr & Elizabeth Weise, Underground Drone Economy 
Takes Flight, USA TODAY (Dec. 2, 2013, 8:04 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/12/02/underground-drone-
economy/3805387/ [perma.cc/RR5J-P34Y]. 
310 See Mark Scott, DHL to Begin Deliveries by Drone in Germany, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014, 6:20 AM), 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/dhl-to-begin-deliveries-by-drone-
in-germany/ [perma.cc/4DEM-3KWP] (“In the world of drones, Europe is out 
to show that whatever the United States can do, it can do better.”). 
311 Id. 
312 Andy Pasztor, FAA Panel Splits on Drone Tracking Requirements, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017, 12:54 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/faa-
panel-splits-on-drone-tracking-requirements-1507654447. 
313 Sally French, The Fight That’s Roiling the Drone Industry: Small 
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committee is poorly managed and has met in secret erodes 
confidence in a regulatory environment that will be fair, let 
alone quick, to adapt to the emerging UAV market.314  
Rulemaking is not necessarily a linear process, of 
course. But, the early history of lawmaking in the 
arena of civil drones suggests a better way forward—
for drones and other technologies in the IoT. Perhaps: 
[T]he better alternative to a top down regulation is to 
deal with concerns creatively as they develop, using a 
combination of educational efforts, technological 
empowerment tools, social norms, public and 
watchdog pressure, industry best practices and self-
regulation, transparency, and targeted enforcement of 
existing legal standards (especially torts), as needed. 
This bottom-up and layered approach to dealing with 
problems will not preemptively suffocate technological 
experimentation and innovation in these spaces.315 
Indeed, treating civil drones as a “permissionless innovation” 
may be appropriate whereby:  
[E]xperimentation with new technologies and 
business models should generally be permitted by 
 
314 See, e.g., Michael Lars, Federal Drone Advisory Panel Knocked for 




5e285c7f4512_story.html (quoting San Francisco Mayor Edwin M. Lee (D)) 
(“There is a stark imbalance of perspectives and viewpoints favoring 
industry interests at the expense of local and state governments and 
members of the public.…Because the process was flawed, the 
recommendations produced by that process are also flawed.”); Michael Lars, 
A U.S. Drone Advisory Group Has Been Meeting in Secret for Months. It 
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315 Thierer, supra note 20, at 3–4. 
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default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a 
new invention will bring serious harm to individuals, 
innovation should be allowed to continue unabated, 
and problems—if they develop at all—can be 
addressed later. Permissionless innovation is not an 
absolutist position that denies any role for 
government. Rather, it is an aspirational goal that 
stresses the benefit of pushing “innovation allowed” as 
the best default position to begin debates about 
technology policy. The burden of proof is on those who 
favor preemptive, precautionary controls to explain 
why ongoing trial-and-error experimentation with 
new technologies or business models should be 
disallowed.316 
In the final analysis, treating civil drones exceptionally is 
inconsistent with the way regulators treat other 
contemporary innovations in transportation and bodes poorly 
for how regulators might approach technologies even more 
disruptive than drones. For example, automakers are not 
required to win pre-approval of self-driving vehicle 
technologies.317  Existing laws say almost nothing about 
personal flying machines such as those currently offered by 
startups such as Kitty Hawk.318 And, in as soon as three years 
from now, a further regulatory challenge may arrive when 
Uber may be flying cars.319 The marketplace will not be well 
served if the precautionary regulatory configuration 
associated with civil drones prevails. 
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